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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: SPAIN AND DENMARK**

by

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March 2009

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**ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
SPAIN AND DENMARK**

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ABSTRACT

Since 11 September 2001, the specter of Islamic terrorism has become of increasing concern. The 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 7 July 2005 London subway bombings, and the 20 June 2007 Glasgow Airport attack brought home the threat of Islamic terrorism to the European Union (EU). In order to deal with this newly recognized threat, the European Union and its member states have taken different approaches to deal with the problem. Overall, the EU has turned away from traditional counter-terrorism efforts, which tend to be reactive, toward the prevention of the radicalization that may lead to Islamic terrorism. But these anti-radicalization efforts are not coordinated and the lack of a common anti-radicalization strategy may be hindering its efforts. This lack of coordination is best illustrated by the differing approaches taken by Spain and Denmark. Spain and Denmark's efforts may represent of two potential paths for the future of the EU. The EU can continue protecting existing national identities and multiculturalism or it can forge a common European identity.

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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. PURPOSE

How are Spain and Denmark trying to prevent the radicalization of their Muslim minorities? While both countries are members of the European Union and subject to its legislative requirements, they have had different experiences with Muslim immigrants and have implemented different strategies for preventing the radicalization of their Muslim communities as part of their counter-terrorism efforts. Spain has pursued a multiculturalist approach, while Denmark has promoted assimilation. To what extent have their strategies been successful? To what extent have their efforts complied with EU policies? The inability of the EU and its member states to develop a common strategy for integrating their Muslim minorities may hamper the implementation of measures to counter Islamic radicalism.

B. IMPORTANCE

With the spread of radical Islam over the past decade and the increasing growth of immigrant Muslim communities in Europe, the threat of radical Islamic terrorism has increased. The growing perception among non-Muslims that Muslims may endorse radical Islamic ideas, or at least allow them to flourish within their local communities, has created tensions between Muslim communities and their neighbors. Reports of Islamic charities such as the Holy Land Foundation and the Global Relief Foundation financing terrorist organizations fuel this perception.¹ Attacks such as the one on Britain's Glasgow Airport in June 2007 fuel anti-Muslim sentiment. Communities that feel oppressed or separated from the rest of society are more likely to support terrorist activities.

¹ Nikos Passas, "Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas" in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 25.

The European Union, aside from dealing with trade and regional policies involving its twenty-seven member states, is faced with regional security issues stemming from a relatively recent increase in immigration, especially of non-European and non-Christian groups. The EU faces an issue, Islamic terrorism, that spans borders, is difficult to counter, and threatens the stability of the European community.

As EU member states, Denmark and Spain are obligated to enact legislation and policies that mirror those of the EU. This thesis examines these two countries' assessments of their Muslim communities and their efforts to prevent support for terrorism. Spain has a long history of conflict with its Muslim communities, including the era from the Moorish invasion of Spain in 711 to the 1492 *Reconquista* carried out by its Catholic King and Queen. This history has continued to influence Spain's relations with its Muslim citizens and immigrants. Spain today has one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe, and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2007 called Spain part of the Islamic Caliphate.² Denmark, in contrast, has a relatively small immigrant Muslim population that has only been introduced in the last century. This Protestant country has long been noted for its tolerance.

In both countries, Islamic terrorism is a modern threat. Spain experienced the 2004 train bombings carried out by Islamic terrorists while Denmark received threats resulting from the publishing of depictions of Mohammed in its newspapers on 30 September 2005. Both countries have increased their counter-terrorist raids and have identified terrorist supporters within the Muslim community. Existing studies of European terrorist organizations agree that there is some level of support within local ethnic or social communities. This support facilitates radicalization efforts within the community. There is scant evidence, however, of generalized support within the Muslim communities in Europe for terrorist organizations.

This creates a dilemma for policy makers trying to deal with the issue. The objective of preventing the radicalization process that facilitates Islamic terrorism leads to questions of how the Muslim communities are integrated into European society. But

² Ayman al-Zawahiri quoted in John Daly, "Spain Alarmed by Recent Terrorist Attacks in North Africa," *Terrorism Focus*, vol. 4, no. 11 (24 April 2007), 3.

actions directed at assimilation or multiculturalism may in some cases increase feelings of alienation and even foster radicalization and support for Islamic terrorism within the Muslim communities.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

How do policies of multiculturalism or assimilation affect efforts to prevent the radicalization of minority communities and Muslim minority communities specifically? To counter the causes of terrorism and radicalization, states must determine how they will integrate their immigrant and minority populations into the larger society. This is not an easy task. As illustrated below in the literature review, there is no consensus as to which approach is more effective. Much of the argument is based on personal bias and ideologies. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that both policies of multiculturalism and assimilation can be effective in the attempt to prevent the radicalization of Muslim minorities. To prevent radicalization, it may be argued, a government should pursue a policy that enables minorities to be accepted into the community at large and not be segregated or excluded. It is probable that Spain and Denmark chose different methods for the integration of their minority populations due to their distinctly different past and present day experiences with immigration and Islam.

One of the major problems with examining the anti-radicalization efforts is the emotional reaction that many citizens have towards particular governmental policies. The same holds true for outside assessments of those policies. Another problem is that current anti-terrorism efforts that have created a sense of victimhood within European Muslim communities. Many within these communities are likely to feel targeted or viewed with suspicion by the host government or majority population. Moreover, socio-economic disparities and cultural practices sometimes separate immigrant and minority populations from the majority.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Community Support

If there is general support in the local European Muslim communities for terrorist organizations, identifying the methods of support would be vital to preventing it. As noted in the previous two sections, it is difficult to identify any significant levels of support within the Muslim communities in Europe for terrorist organizations. Certain aspects of these Muslim communities may facilitate the activities of terrorists within the community, but there is no evidence of communal support.

The concept of mobility within Muslim communities is important. It is not uncommon for European Muslims to travel to their native homelands for personal and business reasons. Even jihadists are expected to return home to spend time with their families and to recruit others to the cause.³ Moreover, all Muslims strive to make at least one pilgrimage to Mecca in their lives. Napoleoni discusses the movement of European Muslims to carry out suicide attacks in Israel and Iraq.⁴ In his discussion of the hawala networks, Looney illustrates the economic incentives that often lead Muslims to move to different countries.⁵ Numerous imams have come to Europe from abroad at the request of Muslim communities. In some cases, these imams already belong to radical Islamic groups.⁶

There is consensus in the literature that, while mobility within the community facilitates a terrorist's movements, it does not necessarily mean acceptance by the community. Lentini notes that while some of the 9/11 hijackers were part of a terror cell in Hamburg, Germany, they were not drawn from the large Turkish Muslim community

³ Ersel Aydinli, "From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists' Achilles Heel," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 18, no. 2 (2006), 306.

⁴ Loretta Napoleoni, *Terrorism Financing in Europe*, *Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2005), 50-52.

⁵ Robert Looney, "Hawala: The Terrorist's Informal Financial Mechanism," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 166.

⁶ Javier Jordan and Luisa Boix, "Al-Qaeda and Western Islam," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2004), 10-11.

but were radicalized outside that community; indeed, most of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia.⁷ Likewise, French-born Zacarias Moussaoui was radicalized in Britain, away from his original Moroccan immigrant community.⁸

Mosques are central institutions in any Muslim community. Experts agree that mosques have played a role in radicalizing Muslims. The existence of a network of mosques that support Al Qaeda has received a lot of attention. Zacarias Moussaoui was provided financial and emotional support by the network.⁹ According to Napoleoni, European intelligence services think that the mosque network remains an effective source of recruiting, financing, and coordination for Islamic terrorism in Europe.¹⁰ Despite these reports, little empirical evidence supports the claims of widespread mosque support for terror groups.

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, Muslim students in London celebrated, and prayers were offered for Osama bin Laden at the Center for Islamic Studies in Milan; these events created the impression that Muslim communities in Europe generally supported these terrorist acts.¹¹ This perception differed from the reaction to the 1996 murder of seven Christian monks in Algeria in the name of Islam; in this case wide-spread condemnation of the acts by Muslims quickly dispelled any idea of support.¹² Since 9/11, the numerous arrests of individuals living inconspicuously in Muslim communities have reinforced the belief that there is a vast gap between the real feelings of European Muslims about terrorism and their public statements. This has led

⁷ Peter Lentini, "Countering Terrorism as if Muslims Matter: Cultural Citizenship and Civic Pre-Emption in Anti-Terrorism" in., *Terrorism, Organised Crime and Corruption: Networks and Linkages*, ed. Leslie Holmes (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007), 215.

⁸ Loretta Napoleoni, "Terrorism Financing in Europe" in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 173.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁰ Napoleoni, "Terrorism Financing in Europe," 49.

¹¹ Jordan and Boix, *Al-Qaeda and Western Islam*, 7.

¹² Anna Bozzo, "Islam and Civil Society in Algeria and France in the Age of Globalisation: The Islamic Umma Confronted with Terrorism," *Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1997), 3.

to increased distrust of the Muslim communities and has enabled radical Islamist groups to propagate the belief that Muslims are being persecuted by the West.¹³

2. Assimilation or Multiculturalism

One of the great debates within any government is on how to make immigrants into citizens. There is no consensus in the literature as to whether policies of assimilation or multiculturalism are more effective. Experts do agree that radicalization and terrorism may stem from failed attempts at the integration of minorities into the host society. In particular, terrorists who come from Muslim diasporas usually fit into one of three categories: converts to Islam, second-generation failed assimilations, and first-generation migrants who do not fit into their new society.¹⁴

Multiculturalism is often seen as the “liberal” approach to integrating immigrants into the host society. Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano define two concepts of equality. The first is “the right to assimilate to the majority/dominant culture in the public sphere; and toleration of the ‘difference’ in the private sphere,” which is assimilation. The second is “the right to have one’s ‘difference’ (minority ethnicity, etc.) recognized and supported in the public and private spheres,” which is multiculturalism.¹⁵ However, they argue that multiculturalism actually requires support from both concepts because it requires the finding and cultivating of common ground between the minority and majority cultures. They further argue that it is not the cultural assimilation of individual immigrants that is at issue, but the recognition of the group identity that makes multiculturalism important.¹⁶ According to this argument, minority group recognition through multiculturalism allows individuals to actively participate in society while retaining their unique cultural or ethnic identity.

¹³ Jordan and Boix, *Al-Qaeda and Western Islam*, 6-7.

¹⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich*, (2007), vii.

¹⁵ Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano, “Secularism and the accommodation of Muslims in Europe” in *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*, eds. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (New York: Routledge, 2006), 171.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 172.

Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, disagrees. He argues that for European Muslims, society is like a family in which one parent is the Muslim community and the other is European society. Both parents are responsible for the actions of their children, but the European parent is responsible for failures of social integration.¹⁷ He further argues that multiculturalism has created a “patchwork of communities not connected together.”¹⁸

According to Jytte Klausen, multiculturalists argue that Western states must grant self-governance to minority groups in certain areas of public policy due to cultural differences. Critics argue that this approach is a violation of Western societies’ entrenched value systems. Klausen further states that it is difficult to identify whose rights come first within a multicultural society.¹⁹

Bruce Bawer argues that European governments have historically viewed immigrants as victims. As a result, problems related to immigration have been seen by European elites as the result of racism; these elites believe that certain culturally specific issues (for example, relating to diet) must be accepted as part of a multicultural society. Essentially, Bawer contends that European governments have ignored many problems caused by immigration in the name of maintaining multiculturalism. According to Bawer’s argument, the problems derive from an attempt to not be seen as “racist.”²⁰

Yet the European Union, according to Aggestan and Hill, is based on the very principle of multiculturalism. The founding treaty of the European Community protects the cultural identity of its member states.²¹ Proponents of multiculturalism maintain that cultural diversity enriches the society as a whole, so the members of the EU should

¹⁷ “The Other in our Midst: After the London Bombing,” *New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 4 (Fall 2005), 15, Interview with Nathan Gardels.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁹ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 196.

²⁰ Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How radical Islam is destroying the West from within* (New York: Broadway Books, 2006), 64.

²¹ Lisbeth Aggestam and Christopher Hill, “The Challenge of Multiculturalism in European Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs –London Then Oxford*, vol. 84, no. 1 (2008), 99.

protect the cultural identities of their citizens in keeping with the spirit of the EU. Critics argue that multiculturalism policies lead to segregation and socio-economic disparities between communities.

Assimilation has become a hotly debated topic, especially since 11 September 2001. Klausen argues that the focus of political discourse has moved from multiculturalism to assimilation. This change in policy from granting certain rights to immigrants and reliance on the “welfare state as a vehicle for integration” has become overtly assimilationist and coercive.²² According to assimilationists, minority groups should assimilate into the majority by accepting the cultural and moral codes of the host country. Aggestan and Hill argue that this assimilationist approach is an effort to deny the very existence of the immigrant.²³ Erik Bleich agrees with this assessment and states that strict assimilationist policies aimed at creating homogeneity may lead to “preparationist” policies which highlight cultural differences as a preparation for the expulsion of minorities.²⁴

As illustrated above, there is not a consensus as to whether governments should pursue policies of multiculturalism or assimilation with regard to their growing immigrant, and especially Muslim, populations. Much of the recent literature argues that efforts towards multiculturalism have failed to achieve their goals. States are now pursuing policies of assimilation in response to increased Muslim immigration and fears of terrorism. However, there is no evidence that either method has proven more effective than the other at preventing the radicalization of European Muslims.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis conducts a comparative case study evaluating Danish and Spanish counter-terrorism assessments and efforts affecting Muslim communities and contrast these national policies with those of the European Union. Similarities and differences in

²² Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 69.

²³ Aggestan and Hill, *The Challenge of Multiculturalism*, 104.

²⁴ Erik Bleich, “From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Educational Multiculturalism in England and France,” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 31, no. 1 (October 1998), 84.

the anti-radicalization efforts of Spain and Denmark are examined and their effectiveness is evaluated. Specifically, the thesis considers the history of Islamic migration and the importance of tolerance within each country with regard to minority communities; the country's immigration policies; efforts towards multiculturalism or assimilation and the effect on preventing radicalization; and finally, current counter-terrorism efforts and their effects on the Muslim communities.

The thesis relies on primary source official documents of the European Union, Spain, and Denmark to identify government anti-radicalization policies and to determine each government's assessment of their effectiveness.

F. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Are Danish and Spanish actions in line with the EU's stated principles or have threats to national security led Copenhagen and Madrid to disregard EU policies? This thesis investigates these questions and determines the apparent impact of national policies on Muslim communities and their potential support for terrorism. Chapter II examines the European Union's assessment of support for terrorism in the Muslim communities in Europe and the efforts the EU is making to prevent radicalization. Chapter III considers Spain's complex history with regard to Islam and tolerance, its immigration policies, and its efforts to combat terrorism and radicalization through multiculturalism. Chapter IV discusses Denmark's reputation for tolerance, its immigration policies, and its efforts to prevent radicalization through assimilation. Finally, Chapter V evaluates the success of Denmark and Spain in combating radicalization and upholding the policies of the European Union. It also identifies potential problems that may arise in other European Union member states due to the increasing Muslim population in Europe. Finally, it determines whether the European Union's policies are effective or need to be reexamined and amended.

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II. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

How do Muslims in Europe become radicalized to the point that they are willing to carry out terrorist attacks? More importantly, why are Muslims becoming radicalized and how prevalent is radicalization within the European Union? These are important questions that have been asked following the 30 June 2007 Glasgow International Airport attack, the 7 July 2005 London subway bombings, the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the 2 November 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh. In each case, the attacks were conducted by Muslims living within EU countries, and the attackers were retrospectively regarded as Islamic terrorists. It is easy to blame Islam as the root cause of the attacks, claiming it creates Islamic radicals. But that is not sufficient, nor is it wise, because multiple causative factors are involved in an individual's radicalization.

A. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

It is estimated that there are 15 to 20 million Muslims of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian descent living within the EU.²⁵ The labor shortages of the 1960s and 1970s, along with liberal immigration laws, encouraged a large number of Muslim immigrants. The largest communities exist in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Smaller communities reside in other EU countries. These large numbers and the continuing growth of the Muslim communities, which are expected to double over the next 20 to 25 years, and the decreasing birth rate among those of European descent, have made EU cautious. Some experts maintain that the EU leaders are anxious not to strain their relationships with the Muslim communities.²⁶ As a result, it has proven difficult for the EU to deal with the problem. It is important to understand how the EU assesses the radicalization of its Muslim communities and what steps it has taken to combat this radicalization.

²⁵ Paul Gallis, ed., *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, RL33166 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 3.

²⁶ Thérèse Delpech, *International Terrorism and Europe*, Chaillot Paper no. 56 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 7.

B. EU ASSESSMENT OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

Within Europe there are four commonly argued causes of radicalization among European Muslims. These arguments stem from the social and economic situations experienced by large numbers of Muslims living in Europe. They are important factors as, with few exceptions, the majority of Muslims in Europe are fairly recent immigrants. Spain had large numbers of Muslims prior to the Reconquista in 1492, but they were persecuted, expelled, forced to convert, or killed. The Balkan region, due to the long domination and influence of the Ottoman Empire, has, arguably, the only long term, continuous Muslim population inside Europe. As a result, Olivier Roy argues, as most Muslims in Western Europe are recent immigrants, there has not been sufficient acceptance of these “immigrants” in the various societies within the European Union. Or, as Roy says, “No plans were put in place to deal with a long-term Muslim presence in Europe.”²⁷

All too often, religion and religious ideology are confused. This has especially been the case for Muslims, as jihadist ideologies have been perceived as representative of the Islamic religion as a whole. Juan Jose Escobar Stemann has argued that jihadi ideology has been important in creating terrorist groups willing to carry out independent attacks in Europe.²⁸ For Europeans this has been a cause of concern, as the increasing influence of Wahabism and Salafism among European Muslims has been due, in part, to Saudi Arabia’s use of “monetary benefits and educational programs” to spread Wahabism.²⁹ Efforts by Muslims in Europe, in particular second and third generation immigrants, to create a sense of connection with a larger community, caused in part by feelings of incompatibility with either their parents’ culture or Western society (or both), make them prime targets for ideologues. In jihadist ideology, “Jihad is part of the cosmic struggle” and “acts of jihad are seen as demonstrations of faith performed for God by an

²⁷ Olivier Roy quoted in Thérèse Delpech, *International Terrorism and Europe*, 100.

²⁸ Juan Jose Escobar Stemann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 2006), 1.

²⁹ Zachary Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 105.

individual.”³⁰ For Muslims who feel excluded from society and condemn Western values and mores as decadent, there is great appeal in seeking out a pure form of Islam. Since Wahabism and Salafism claim that the only pure Islam is that as practiced by Mohammed and his followers, there is great attraction.

Not everyone agrees that these are the root causes of radicalization among European Muslims. Brendan O’Duffy argues that “[t]he evidence... suggests that a more plausible explanation for the rise of homegrown UK violent jihad is based on interactions between perceptions of justice at the local, national, and international levels.”³¹ This would argue that states can not solely rely on addressing internal economic and social concerns, but would be forced to modify their foreign policies as well to satisfy the concerns of Muslim citizens and residents. Additionally, O’Duffy states that “intergenerational clashes between first, second, and third generation Muslims” along with Islamophobia are important contributing factors.³²

1. Social Inequality

One of the most common problems that immigrants face concerns issues of social equality. This is especially true for groups that are clearly perceived as being different from the majority in the host country. But how much of this inequality is a result of perception rather than reality? Within Europe, different Muslim groups have tended to migrate to certain countries: Maghreb Africans to France and Belgium, Turks to Germany, and South Asians to Great Britain, due to historical and geographical reasons.³³ An Open Society Institute report on the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program, as cited by Brendan O’Duffy, found that Muslims are the most disadvantaged group in Britain, with Pakistani and Bangladeshi men suffering the most from ethnic

³⁰ Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London, UK: I.B. Taurus & Co., 2004), 33.

³¹ Brendan O’Duffy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 41, no. 01 (January 2008), 39.

³² *Ibid.*, 37.

³³ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 100.

inequality.³⁴ Areas of social inequality which immigrants face include access to adequate housing, jobs, schools, religious support, and acceptance by society in general. Racism against the Muslim immigrant communities is believed to be the main cause of social inequality, aside from problems with language skills and educational attainment. Studies tend to support these claims. The 2006 CRS Report entitled *Islamist Extremism in Europe* reported that “a disproportionately large number of Muslims in Europe are poor, unemployed or imprisoned, and many feel a sense of cultural alienation and discrimination.”³⁵

The most significant factor in the perceptions of social inequality is the religious component. Muslims do not just consider Islam to be a religion. In their view, it is a way of life, a part of their culture. Therefore it is impossible to separate religion and culture. So when Muslim immigrants move into Western countries, there is conflict with European customs and laws. As mentioned previously, most of Europe is only now beginning to deal with its Muslim immigrants. While European states have had centuries to work out resolutions regarding relations among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, secularists, and others, the same is not true for Muslims – except for the Balkan region, as noted previously. In the Netherlands, it was not until 1977 that the law regarding the regulation of meat inspection was changed to allow Muslims to ritually slaughter animals. It was not until 1986 that imams were given the same juridical status as priests and rabbis.³⁶ Throughout Europe, Muslims are asking for equal recognition of their religion. Requests for recognition of Islamic holy days as days off have created furious debates. Muslims maintain that recognition of Christian holidays and not Islamic ones is another example of European double standards and discrimination against them.

³⁴ O'Duffy, “Radical Atmosphere,” 40.

³⁵ Kristin Archick, John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, *Islamist Extremism in Europe*, RS22211 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2006), 2.

³⁶ W. A. Shadid, “The Integration of Muslim Minorities in the Netherlands,” *International Migration Review*, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1991), 363-365.

2. Lack of Political Representation

The lack of political representation is a strong cause for grievance that can lead to radicalization, but it is often the perception of an unequal distribution of power on the local, national or even global levels that leads to radicalization.³⁷ In Europe, there are many Muslim politicians and political organizations. The Muslim Parliament, a political organization, has sought to make itself the premier voice for Muslims in the UK. Other groups, such as the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Eire (UMO), have sought to be lobbying groups on behalf of Muslims.³⁸ German legislation to ease naturalization has enabled more immigrants to become German citizens and therefore able to participate in the political process.³⁹ In 2003, the importance of the Muslim communities' vote was clearly illustrated when "German Turks" joined forces with the Social Democrat-Green coalition against the anti-immigrant Christian Democrats.⁴⁰ In France, the formation of the French Council of the Islamic Faith has created a united lobbying group on behalf of all Muslims in France.⁴¹

However, the close relationship between Islam and politics has raised concerns that "political Islam" is seeking to create separate societies in Europe or replace the existing European society with one based on Islam. Jytte Klausen, however, argues that "Europe's Muslim political leaders are not aiming to overthrow liberal democracy and to replace secular law with Islamic religious law," but are focused on finding ways to allow Muslims to build institutions that function within the society.⁴²

Yet, there are still significant problems. Several authors claim that a large percentage of France's Muslim immigrants choose not to apply for citizenship. There do

³⁷ James J. F. Forest, "Exploring Root Causes of Terrorism: An Introduction," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, vol. III, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 3.

³⁸ Steven Vertovec, "Muslims, the State, and the Public Sphere in Britain," in Gerd Nonneman and others, eds., *Muslim Communities in the New Europe* (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 1996), 174.

³⁹ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.

⁴⁰ Omer Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Street," *Foreign Policy*, no. 135 (March – April 2003), 76.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁴² Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 3.

not appear to be any reliable sources on the actual levels of citizenship among first generation immigrants to Europe. This makes it difficult to determine if there are any larger issues of citizenship and political participation within the Muslim community. If Muslims are choosing not to become citizens and participate in the political process, then demands for greater political participation may be unpersuasive. Additionally, while some European governments are trying to encourage greater political participation by moderate Muslims, there are few visible representatives of the Muslim community in European parliaments.⁴³

3. Lack of Economic Opportunity

Within Europe, Muslims have long been the dominant economic immigrant group.⁴⁴ They have traveled to Europe seeking employment, especially following World War II, and many have stayed rather than return to their countries of origin. Liberal European immigration laws allowed them to bring their families, so they had no need to return. However, the economic opportunity that was once readily available for Muslim immigrants has diminished. The earnings of Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent average only “two-thirds of what their white, non-Muslim counterparts” earn, and they tend to be “overrepresented in unemployment and underemployment.”⁴⁵ Young males are often the hardest hit by a lack of economic opportunity. One of Paul Collier’s risk factors for civil war is a “lack of economic opportunities tied to education, fast population growth and economic decline.”⁴⁶ This makes a lot of sense considering that the majority of terrorists are young men. Paul Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu argue that “the vast majority of violent antisocial behavior is generated by young males, often unemployed or underemployed.”⁴⁷

⁴³ Kristin Archick, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” 5.

⁴⁴ Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 100.

⁴⁵ Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens*, 106-107.

⁴⁶ Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, World Bank Report (June 15, 2000), 7.

⁴⁷ Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Socioeconomic and Demographic Roots of Terrorism,” in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, vol. III, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 163.

It should nonetheless be noted that Osama bin Laden is from a wealthy and privileged background. Many other Islamic terrorists, like Mohammed Atta, have been well-educated, with some holding advanced degrees. Many European terrorists, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, came from upper and middle class families. The lack of economic opportunity argument ignores, or downplays, the importance of radical ideology in motivating potential terrorists.

Brendan O'Duffy found that even moderate Muslim respondents made a common theme of economic competition between immigrants. He also found that there were strong negative attitudes toward government efforts in terms of housing and employment training; this may be partly owing to the belief that Christian immigrants receive advantages.⁴⁸ There was also a tendency on the part of Muslims to blame their lack of economic opportunity on "blocked mobility and national and international conspiracies."⁴⁹ Marc Sageman argues that many of the "third wave" of Islamic terrorists, the children of Muslim immigrants, are largely from the middle to lower socio-economic classes in Europe as a result of their unskilled parents' immigration.⁵⁰

It is difficult to determine whether if the economic problems are exacerbated by racism or xenophobia, as the data is not available. Yet, the situation faced by Muslim immigrants and their children is not different from what non-Muslims have faced in Europe and the West for centuries. Therefore, the lack of economic opportunity will always remain a source of contention for all immigrant groups, but Muslim immigrants with higher educations and marketable skills will fare better. For European governments, as the Muslim population continues to grow, problems over economic opportunity will likely continue.

⁴⁸ O'Duffy, "Radical Atmosphere," 41.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁰ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 50.

4. Lack of Integration or Assimilation

There are many assertions that European governmental failures to fully integrate Muslims into society have left Muslim communities more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Additionally, European Muslims, especially youth of the second and third generations, feel disenfranchised and rejected by a society that does not truly accept them; so they may turn to Islam as a sign of their cultural identity.⁵¹ A circumstance that makes integration or assimilation more difficult is the fact most minority communities congregate in particular areas or neighborhoods. In the UK, the Muslim North African community is confined to the urban areas, especially North London.⁵² These areas tend to become isolated ethnic and religious enclaves cut off from the rest of society. These ghetto-like neighborhoods can hinder or prevent integration and acceptance into the greater society and facilitate radicalization. Robert Leiken argues that the “very isolation of these diaspora communities obscures their inner workings, allowing mujahideen to fundraise, prepare, and recruit for jihad with a freedom available in few Muslim countries.”⁵³

France is the country often considered to be the most experienced in integrating Muslim immigrants. According to Robert Leiken, “Group identities are discouraged in France by tradition, custom, history, practice and social norms” as an active part of its assimilation policies. France’s large Muslim community is still “marked by levels of frustration, violence and hate crimes far higher than in Germany or Britain.”⁵⁴ Even countries that have tried to protect immigrants’ cultural heritages while integrating them into society have faced an increasing threat from Muslim radicalization.

Olivier Roy argues that for many radical Muslims in Europe, “the idea of a ‘home country’ makes no sense...it is better to join an ‘imaginary ummah’ than a real

⁵¹ Kritisin, Archick, *Islamist Extremism in Europe*, 2-3.

⁵² Jonathan Githens-Mazer, “Variations on a Theme: Radical Violent Islamism and European North African Radicalization,” *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 41, no. 1 (January 2008), 20.

⁵³ Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 4 (July-August 2005), 121.

⁵⁴ Robert S. Leiken, *Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security After 9/11* (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2004), 86.

country.”⁵⁵ As a result of their lack of assimilation and rejection of a new national identity, some European Muslims link “deterritorialisation and radical Islamisation” together; this phenomenon is common among the Palestinians.⁵⁶

C. EU ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

In order to understand the European Union’s anti-radicalization efforts and assess their effectiveness, it is important to emphasize certain aspects of the EU structure. It is easy for non-Europeans to mistake the EU as a federalist system or “United States of Europe.” While some in Europe support this vision of the EU, this is far from the truth. The EU is no longer just the economic community of the past. The EU has become a body with the ability to pass legislation that member states are obligated to enact and enforce or face sanctions. Yet, the EU is not able to pass just any legislation; the need for consensus is a huge limiting factor. As a result, EU legislation, proposed by the Council of Ministers or the European Commission, is usually limited to those areas where all member states agree. National governments wish to protect their sovereignty.

EU legislation is published in the form of a regulation, a directive or decision by the European Council or Commission. Regulations have the power of direct effect. Decisions and directives also require implementation, but each member state can determine how it is done. Action Plans have no basis in EU law but offer suggestions on how to deal with particular issues. As a result, the EU publishes a number of action plans or framework decisions.

From the EU’s perspective, the prevention of the radicalization of Muslim communities is best achieved by ensuring that Muslims are granted the same rights as all other citizens. It is anticipated that Muslims who believe that they are being treated fairly and without discrimination will be difficult to radicalize and will integrate better into society. Therefore, anti-radicalization efforts have been directed towards solving the social inequality and lack of economic opportunity that Muslims face.

⁵⁵ Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 68-69.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC, entitled “Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,” plays an important role in ensuring these rights. Additionally, Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, *Non-Discrimination* and *Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity*⁵⁷ respectively, have shaped how the EU responds toward Islamic radicalization. As cultural diversity has been a cornerstone of the Maastricht version of the Treaty on European Union and its successors, the EU has been implementing policies to counter racism and xenophobia since the early 1990s. The extension of these rights to immigrants has made the EU wary of policies and statements that might be construed as specifically targeting one ethnic, religious or cultural group. Therefore, the EU has not specifically targeted Muslims with anti-radicalization or counter-terrorism measures but has taken steps to ensure that its legislation applies to all groups.

At the Commission level, the EU has been quick to separate Islam from terrorist attacks because there is a feeling among many EU officials that focusing on Muslims in the EU’s initiatives targeting extremism or promoting integration “could be counterproductive in that they [might] further feelings, among some Muslims, of exclusion and discrimination.”⁵⁸ The European Commission has issued guidelines to prevent the words “Muslim” or “Islam” from being used in reference to terrorism under the terms of the 2000 Race Directive, which was to be enacted in domestic law by all member states by 2003. Under the Directive (Articles 1 and 2), direct or indirect discrimination was prohibited.⁵⁹ This has been taken to the extreme at the Commission level in order to prevent a perception of discrimination by any group. It is also likely intended to protect Muslim communities from stigmas associated with Islamic extremist organizations.

⁵⁷ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2007 C 303/01.

⁵⁸ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, 48.

⁵⁹ Council of the European Community, “Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin,” Council Directive 2000 /43/EC.

Some critics might argue that the EU is ignoring the threat posed by Islamic terrorist supporters operating within the Muslim communities, such as accused terrorist financier Youssef Nada.⁶⁰ Youssef Nada was subject to a UN travel ban limiting his movements to Switzerland but still freely traveled throughout Europe, crossing many EU borders without any restraints.⁶¹ The fact that all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were Muslim migrants who came through Europe and were radicalized could support this argument. However, Peter Lentini notes that while most of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, they were radicalized in extremist circles outside the local European Muslim communities.⁶² Still, this is also likely to cause problems for EU member states such as France, Spain and the United Kingdom that have been attacked by terrorists and terror organizations that are in fact Muslim.

It was not until after the Madrid attacks in 2004 that the EU adopted the *Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union*. This document recalled the EU's commitment to opposing racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia; established a wide reaching response to the causes of terrorism; and reaffirmed the basic rights of EU citizens. The document emphasizes the integration of immigrants. Section III (1.5) states that "stability and cohesion within our societies benefit from the successful integration of legally resident third country nationals and their descendents...to prevent the isolation of certain groups."⁶³ This is part of the EU's effort to prevent radicalization and recruitment for terrorist activities. The EU has realized that there is a "perception of Islamophobia following 9/11 in Europe and that anti-terrorism laws are being applied abusively against Muslims."⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Loretta Napoleoni, "Terrorism Financing in Europe," *Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2005), 52-55.

⁶¹ Ibid., 52.

⁶² Peter Lentini, "Countering Terrorism as if Muslims Matter: Cultural Citizenship and Civic Pre-Emption in Anti-Terrorism," in *Terrorism, Organised Crime and Corruption: Networks and Linkages*, ed. Leslie Holmes (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007), 215.

⁶³ Council of the European Union, *The Hague Programme*, 16054/04, 10.

⁶⁴ Stemmann, "Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe," 8.

The Hague Programme further outlines the key principles for policy to integrate immigrants and their descendents into society. These principles state that integration: 1) is a continuous, two-way process involving the host society and the immigrant; 2) includes, but goes beyond, anti-discrimination policy; 3) implies respect for the basic values of the EU and fundamental human rights; 4) requires basic skills for participation in society; 5) relies on intercultural dialogue and interaction between all members of society to improve mutual understanding; and 6) extends to other policy areas such as employment and education.⁶⁵ These policy guides are intended to address many of the areas of grievance that can lead to radicalization but they are not requirements that member states must implement.

The most significant development in the efforts to prevent radicalization is the development of a counter-terrorism strategy, first proposed in the Hague Programme. “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism” was approved in November 2005. Key to this strategy is the recognition that “[r]adicalization and recruitment to terrorism are not confined to one belief system or political persuasion....But the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qa’ida and extremists inspired by Al-Qa’ida has become the main terrorist threat to the Union.”⁶⁶ While this is one of the few EU documents to specifically mention Muslims, stating that “Al-Qa’ida and those inspired by them will only be defeated with the engagement of the public, and especially Muslim,” it maintains that the EU will not undermine the fundamental rights of its citizens.⁶⁷ The EU will 1) “disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism;” 2) “ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism;” and 3) “promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all.”⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Council of the European Union, *The Hague Programme*, 16054/04, 11.

⁶⁶ Council of the European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism,” 14781/1/05, 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

In order to disrupt the activities of networks and individuals radicalizing and recruiting people, the EU recognizes the need to monitor the internet and travel to conflict areas as well as to counter “those playing a role in radicalization including in prisons, places of education or religious training, and worship.”⁶⁹ The EU also wants to empower moderate voices and to “encourage the emergence of European imams and enhance language and other training for foreign imams in Europe” to promote non-radical ideas. Most importantly, the EU plans to “co-ordinate and enhance our efforts to change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly among Muslim communities, and to correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims” by avoiding linkages of Islam to terrorism.⁷⁰ Lastly, the EU aims to correct the conditions that create an environment in which radicalization can thrive. Within the EU, it intends to target inequalities and discrimination and to “promote inter-cultural dialogue, debate, and, where appropriate, long term integration.” Outside Europe, it desires to promote good governance, human rights, democracy, as well as education and economic prosperity, through “political dialogue and assistance programs.”⁷¹

In February 2007, the Council of the EU approved the revised “Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan.” The revision, based on new insights, added some new points but did not change the key aspects of the strategy.⁷² The broad approach of the EU counter-terrorism strategy remains tied to the prevention of radicalization. EU Secretary of State José Magalhães stated that

we should not prevent Radicalization because of terrorism: all of the important policies involved in the fight against Radicalization – education, integration, social solidarity and justice, development assistance, the promotion of international peace, etc. – have a long history in our democracies inspired by a positive vision of the world and by a set of shared values which have oriented the development of our countries for generations. The fight against Radicalization has positive

⁶⁹ Council of the European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism,” 14781/1/05, 3.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁷¹ Ibid., 5.

⁷² Council of the European Union, “Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism,” 9666/07.

goals and ambitions: it is a combat for the expansion of diversity, tolerance, inclusiveness....The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism clearly identifies the challenge of preventing and addressing the radicalization of young people both in the EU and in third countries. Furthermore, it identifies places of education as offering vulnerabilities to those playing a role in radicalization while focusing on the importance of the literature which propagates an extremist worldview which brings individuals to consider and justify violence.⁷³

D. CONCLUSION

While the EU has taken action to implement or recommend policies that address the problems that are believed to cause radicalization, the greater problem for the EU lies within its structure. Due to its structure, the EU has a difficult time developing policy and legislation on which all of its member states will agree. Member states are not required to implement Action Plans and are given a lot of leeway on implementing Framework Decisions. While the Hague Program and the “Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan” recognize the linkages between radicalization, diasporas and terrorism, there has been friction in the implementation of the policies. According to Doron Zimmerman, the senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zurich, “The tools necessary for counterterrorism initiatives are not available because of the EU structure and the tension between what the body aspires to be and what it actually is capable of doing.”⁷⁴ Even the EU recognizes that “the challenge of combating radicalization and terrorist recruitment lies primarily with the member states, at a national, regional and local level.”⁷⁵ Framework Decisions and Action Plans do not have the power of direct effect. As a result, EU member states pursue a wide variety of anti-radicalization measures.

⁷³ In a speech at the Conference on “Countering Radicalization: Perspectives and Strategies from around the Globe” at the Hague on 22 Oct 2007.

⁷⁴ Doron Zimmerman, “Terrorism, Diasporas and the EU Response” in *Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich*, eds. Bruce Hoffman and others (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007), 6-7.

⁷⁵ “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism,” 14781/1/05, 6.

Varying implementation or the lack of enforcement of EU policies can create problems. Nationalistic tendencies, combined with internal dynamics within member states, play an important role in how EU policies are carried out. As a result, implementation of EU anti-radicalization efforts appears to be haphazard. Some states seem to have been more focused in anti-radicalization efforts than others. However, this is difficult to assess, as the EU has not provided specific guidance on how anti-radicalization policy should be implemented. As they are not directives approved by the European Council and the European Commission, there is no requirement for the recommendations to be adopted. This provides member states with a large degree of latitude in how they choose to implement the EU policy.

As illustrated above, the EU has identified radicalization as a significant problem and seeks to prevent it as part of its larger counter-terrorism and human rights efforts. To that extent, the EU is maintaining its ideals and adhering to its principles. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the EU, as a whole, will be effective in preventing terrorism. The inability of the EU to develop common integration policies creates imbalances as to how Muslims are integrated into mainstream national societies in the EU and may create conditions for Islamic radicalization. As illustrated in the next two chapters, member states have chosen different methods to prevent the radicalization of their Muslim communities and have achieved distinct results. Internal political dynamics have an important role in how anti-radicalization efforts are carried out.

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III. SPAIN'S ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

Spain and Britain are the only countries in Europe to have suffered major internal Islamic terrorist attacks since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings served as a wake-up call for Spain in recognizing the threat posed by Islamic terrorism. Because the attacks were carried out by Moroccan nationals aligned with Al Qaeda, Spain realized that its growing Muslim population constituted a potential pool of recruits for radical Islamic groups. Additionally, the 4 January 2004 reference by Osama bin Laden to Spain as the “lost al-Andalus” served as a prominent reminder that some Muslims still think of Spain as a territory that should be part of a greater Islamic caliphate.⁷⁶

Spain, of all the Western European countries, arguably has historically had the most fractious relationship with Muslims. It also is the only European state that still retains territory in North Africa, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla that border Morocco. These factors must have an important impact on how Spain is attempting to prevent the radicalization of its Muslims. Given Spain's historical reputation of intolerance towards minority groups, it could be expected to see high degrees of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. But this has not been the case. What is it about Spain that has prevented this anticipatory reaction? The apparent answer is Spain's emphasis on multiculturalism and its growing acceptance of diversity.

Are Spain's multicultural policies an effective method for preventing the radicalization of its Muslims and other immigrant communities? Unlike some other European states, Spain has embraced multiculturalism, rather than assimilation, as a key component of its integration efforts. Critics may argue that, as in Britain, multiculturalism does not provide incentives for immigrants to integrate into mainstream society and fosters parallel societies.⁷⁷ However, multiculturalism is an important

⁷⁶ Bruce Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, translated by James Howarth (New York: Verso, 2005), 227.

⁷⁷ Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 4 (July – August 2005), 127.

element of the European Union's anti-radicalization policy. This chapter examines how and why Spain has incorporated multiculturalism as part of its anti-radicalization efforts. It also illustrates how these efforts appear to be effective and reflect the spirit of EU laws by providing means of empowerment and redress for the Muslim community.

A. TOLERANCE

Whether the widespread impression is justified or not, the Spanish do not enjoy a reputation for tolerance toward minorities. Their dubious reputation is due in part to the expulsions of the Muslims and Jews from Spain beginning in 1492. It is further fueled by the poor treatment of indigenous peoples under the rule of the Spanish Empire. Most recently, the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco from 1939 to 1975 was characterized by an often brutal suppression of regional identities and an emphasis on Spanish nationalism. However, it is important to remember that Spain has always been a multicultural society, despite the attempts to homogenize it. Nations and cultural attitudes are shaped by past experiences, whether they are publicly recognized or not. To understand the relationship between Islam and Spain, especially today, it is necessary to understand the historical impact of Islam and Islamic culture on Spain.

1. Islam in Spain

The year 711 A.D. is often considered an infamous year in the Christian world, for that was the year that brought Islam and Christianity into conflict in Western Europe. In July 711, Muslim forces, composed of Berbers, Arabs, Syrians, and others who were united solely by Islam and a common language, crossed into Spain (al-Andalus).⁷⁸ By 722, most of the Iberian peninsula, except for a tiny portion of northern Spain, was controlled by the Moors, as the Christians came to call the Muslims. The failure to

⁷⁸ John A. Crow. *Spain: The Root and the Flower* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 42.

conquer additional territory in Gaul following their defeat at the Battle of Poitiers in 733 resulted in Moorish infighting. This forced the Moors to consolidate their gains and retreat southwards.⁷⁹

Muslim rule was tolerant and progressive. Slaves could gain their freedom simply by converting to Islam.⁸⁰ The Jews no longer suffered under the heavy anti-Semitism they had faced before. One of the reasons for Jewish support of the Muslim invaders, against the Visigoths, was the realization that Jews in Syria and Egypt were treated distinctively better under Islamic rule than Jews under Christian rule.⁸¹ Christians and Jews were allowed to practice their faiths but they were not part of the greater Muslim society.⁸² Many Christians converted to Islam, but conversion was not mandatory. Inter-marriage became commonplace. For example, Alfonso VI took a daughter of a caliph of Seville as a wife just as many Christian kings married their daughters off to Muslims.⁸³ This inter-marriage led to a wide variety of physiognomies in the population, to such an extent that it would have been difficult to distinguish a Christian from a Jew or a Muslim. In reality, there was a “hispanized cultural fusion” of Muslim and Christian, which could be seen in the architecture and way of life.⁸⁴ While most of the Christians recognized the power of Islamic culture and sought to benefit from it, a small minority sought to create “an impenetrable wall around the Christian community.”⁸⁵ This group gained prominence as the Reconquista, or reconquest of Catholic Spain, gained a more religious connotation.

Conflict between the communities persisted, but the contributions of the Moors in science, mathematics, medicine, and architecture flowed into Europe and helped lead

⁷⁹ Crow. *Spain: The Root and the Flower*, 80.

⁸⁰ Charles Reginald Haines, *Christianity and Islam in Spain, A.D. 756-1031* (New York: AMS Press, 1889), 21.

⁸¹ Richard Fletcher, *Moorish Spain* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 1993), 24.

⁸² Leonard P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain: 1250-1500* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 73.

⁸³ Crow. *Spain: The Root and the Flower*, 61.

⁸⁴ Andrew Wheatcroft, *Infidels: A History of the Conflict Between Christendom and Islam* (New York: Random House, 2005), 85.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

Europe out of the Dark Ages. The wealth and power amassed by the Moors proved to be enticing to the Christians. Interaction between Christians and Moors was substantial. Christians, such as Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar (El Cid), fought for Moors; and Moors, such as Granada's Muhammad I, fought for Christians. This complex inter-relationship came to an end with the reign of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, who are often called the Catholic Monarchs. The combined strength derived from Ferdinand's and Isabella's unification of Castile and Aragon into a Spanish nation was sufficient to crush any Muslim opposition. Ferdinand and Isabella, like the Catholic clergy, were pledged to the elimination of the Muslims.⁸⁶

The expulsion of the Moors, Jews and gypsies following the capture of Granada, the last Muslim stronghold in Spain in 1492, was done largely to create a homogenous Catholic state. It was accompanied by propaganda that "worked to disqualify and satanize the Islamic religion."⁸⁷ The propaganda also emphasized supposed ethnic and physical characteristics of Muslims and facilitated "the formation of a corpus of stereotypes and clearly degrading clichés."⁸⁸ Such a propagandistic achievement is remarkable in view of the fact that the intermingling of ethnicities had made it almost impossible to distinguish Muslim from Christian based on physical characteristics. However, Muslims who converted to Christianity still faced discrimination at the hands of the "Old Christians," those of the *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood), as still being ethnic Arabs or Berbers and thus inferior.⁸⁹ By 1524, at the request of Pope Clement VII to end the Moorish question, edicts prohibiting the Arab language, clothing, jewels, circumcision, and even halal slaughtering of animals were enacted.⁹⁰ Life for Moriscos (literally, "little Moors," Muslim converts to Christianity who remained in Spain following the Reconquista) and non-converted Muslims began to become more

⁸⁶ Anwar G. Chejne, *Islam and the West: The Moriscos* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983), 5.

⁸⁷ Ricard Zapata-Barrero, "The Muslim Community and Spanish Tradition," in *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*, eds. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (New York: Routledge, 2006), 145.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 145.

⁸⁹ Chejne, *Islam and the West*, 7.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 9.

restrictive. Many of these antagonisms grew out of the fear that the Moriscos were “a fifth column, potentially colluding with North Africans, Egyptians, French...and other Christian heretics,” but also an obstacle to Spanish unity.⁹¹

From 1609, when Philip III expelled the Moriscos because they were suspected of secretly practicing Islam, until the mid-1800s, there were negligible numbers of Muslims within Spain. Yet Spain continued to have a hostile relationship with neighboring Muslims, primarily due to Muslim corsairs (pirates) operating out of North Africa. This kept alive the negative stereotypes and antagonism toward Muslims that Spain used to help justify its African War of 1860. During that conflict the Moroccans were described “as vile, lewd monkeys, dogs, gangsters, etc.”⁹² These stereotypes gave way to a view of the subjugated and submissive Moroccans as “the object of mockery.” They were now regarded as “peasants frightened and astonished by the technology and the fashions introduced by the Spanish.”⁹³

The perception and tolerance of Muslims changed once again following the involvement of Moroccan troops in the Spanish Civil War. General Francisco Franco relied upon mercenaries from Morocco, most of whom were likely Muslims, recruited by General Orgaz, the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco.⁹⁴ This resulted in the creation of new stereotypes by both the Spanish Right (Franco and his supporters, known as Francoists) and the Spanish Left (all those against Franco). The Left depicted the Moroccan mercenaries as “treasonous, cruel, cowardly, drunken, godless, mercenary, greedy, sodomites, and rapists,” while the Francoists were forced to change the traditional stereotypes.⁹⁵ They sought to cast the Moroccans in a respectful and paternalistic light, in which they were the *morito bueno* (good little Moor).⁹⁶

⁹¹ Chejne, *Islam and the West*, 8.

⁹² Zapata-Barrero, “The Muslim Community and Spanish Tradition,” 146.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁹⁴ Paul Preston, *Franco* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 186.

⁹⁵ Zapata-Barrero, “The Muslim Community and Spanish Tradition,” 146.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 146.

But even with their support of Franco in the Civil War, the Moroccans were not welcomed into Spain. Catholicism had become ingrained as a central element of Spanish identity. As Franco said, “In Spain you are a Catholic or you are nothing.”⁹⁷ For Franco, the idea of “hispanidad,” a community of people linked together by linguistic and religious bonds, was vital to Spanish nationalism.⁹⁸ But this notion of Roman Catholic Spain has started to falter as Spain has begun to recognize its diversity of religious faiths, following the death of Franco in 1975. Only then were believers of other religions able to practice their faiths freely.

Spain remained a largely homogenous nation until the 1990s. During the 1950s and 1960s, while other West European countries sought to fill labor shortages through foreign workers, Spain was experiencing emigration. Initially, much of this emigration was to North and South America, but beginning in the 1960s emigration to France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom became commonplace.⁹⁹ The economic boom in the 1990s reversed these trends and resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants to Spain. Yet by December 2000, the number of non-EU immigrants comprised only 2.7 percent of the Spanish population, much lower than the 6 percent of the EU as a whole. Only France and Germany had non-EU immigrant percentages higher than the EU average, at 8.2 and 7.2 percent respectively.¹⁰⁰

Since 2000, the number of non-EU foreigners in Spain has skyrocketed. In 1999, the total number of foreigners living in Spain stood at about 719,600. By 2005, this number had increased by almost 200 percent, to just over 2 million.¹⁰¹ But these immigrants are not evenly distributed throughout Spain. They are concentrated in five of Spain’s seventeen autonomous communities: Catalonia (22.93%); Madrid (20.63%);

⁹⁷ Francisco Franco quoted in Richard Herr, *An Historical Essay on Modern Spain* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 39.

⁹⁸ Zapata-Barrero, “The Muslim Community and Spanish Tradition,” 147.

⁹⁹ Xosé-Manoel Núñez, “History and Collective Memory of Migration in a Land of Migrants,” *History & Memory*, vol. 14.1/2 (2002), 229.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 230.

¹⁰¹ Mary P. Corcoran, “Local Responses to a New Issue: Integrating Immigrants in Spain,” in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *From Immigration to Integration: Local Solutions to a Global Challenge* (2006), 241.

Andalusia (11.70%); Valencia (11.56%); and the Canary Islands (6.40%).¹⁰² As of January 2006, the number of foreign residents (including EU residents) had increased to roughly 4.1 million or 10.22%.¹⁰³ This number counts only legal residents. Due to high levels of illegal immigration, the actual number of foreign residents is much higher. According to Eurostat, Spain saw a decrease to 1 million new immigrants in 2007, likely due to the down turn in Spain's economy.¹⁰⁴ At the present time, the birth rate in Spain is decreasing. Spain, along with most of Europe, is therefore becoming increasingly dependent on immigration to sustain population growth. Thus, the religions professed in Spain are becoming increasingly diverse through immigration.

2. Religious Tolerance

In 1980, the Law of Religious Freedom established "a legal framework and certain privileges for religious organizations."¹⁰⁵ Groups must register with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Office of Religious Affairs and provide documentation that supports their claim to be a religion. However, the MOJ can reject the application, as it has done with Scientology, and instead recognize the group as a cultural association. Judaism, Islam and Protestantism have been recognized as religions by the Spanish government and may be freely practiced, but the Catholic Church has continued to enjoy preferential treatment.

The Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities (FEREDE) estimated in 2007 that there were 1.2 million Protestants in Spain. About 800,000 of them are immigrants or live in the country six months out of the year.¹⁰⁶ A 2006 report by Observatorio Andalusi, associated with the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE), indicated

¹⁰² Mary P. Corcoran, "Local Responses to a New Issue: Integrating Immigrants in Spain," 243.

¹⁰³ Diego Lorente and Lucia Alonso, "Shadow Report 2006: Racism in Spain," European Network Against Racism (ENAR) (October 2007), 8.

¹⁰⁴ Eurostat, "Statistics in Focus," 81/2008, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ As cited by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2007."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

that there were just over 1 million Muslims in Spain; at the same time there are an estimated 48,000 Jews and an estimated 35 million Roman Catholics.¹⁰⁷

While Catholics continue to make up the majority religion in Spain, there are some startling statistics about the numbers of actual practicing Catholics. According to a survey conducted by the Center for Sociological Investigation (CIS), over half of the respondents who consider themselves Roman Catholic almost never attend Mass. Additionally, fewer than half of the people between the ages of 15 and 24 even described themselves as practicing or non-practicing Catholics.¹⁰⁸ This means that the Catholic population is decreasing. This will likely result in a significant religious demographic shift in the next generation or two. Simply put, Catholic Spain will cease to be Catholic.

In addition to the changes in religious demographics and the increase in religious toleration, the growing secularization of Spain can be seen in the social reforms. The current Socialist government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero has come into conflict with the Catholic Church over a number of its social reforms. Since coming to power in March 2004, following the Madrid train bombings, Zapatero's government has legalized gay marriage, made divorce and abortion easier, and amended current religious education programs in schools.¹⁰⁹

The Catholic Church has resisted these changes and the associated secularization of society. Cardinal Antonio Maria Rouco Varela stated, "We live in a society threatened and affected by the loss of hope which suffers from the loss of memory of the Christian inheritance."¹¹⁰ To add fuel to the secularization debate, in May 2008 Deputy Prime Minister María Teresa Fernández de la Vega announced government plans to reform

¹⁰⁷ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2007."

¹⁰⁸ Santa Maria Foundation survey, April 2006, as cited by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2007."

¹⁰⁹ Graham Keeley, "From Inquisition to Uncertainty: The Catholic Church," *El Pais*, September 9, 2004.

¹¹⁰ Cardinal Antonio Maria Rouco Varela quoted in Graham Keeley, "From Inquisition to Uncertainty: The Catholic Church," *El Pais*, September 9, 2004.

Spain's Religious Freedom Law. This plan is “expected to remove religious symbols from public buildings and afford more effective protection to the rights of non-Catholics.”¹¹¹

The Catholic Church also declined a December 2006 request by the Islamic Junta of Spain to allow Muslims to pray at the Cordoba Mezquita, which was a mosque before it was converted into a cathedral following the capture of Cordoba in 1236. The Islamic Junta wanted to convert the mezquita into an ecumenical center for worship by all faiths. However, the Archbishop of Cordoba rejected the request.¹¹² This rejection may fuel feelings that the Muslims in Spain are still being discriminated against, especially as many important Muslim structures were taken over by the Catholics during the Reconquista. How this rejection will affect future relationships between the Catholic Church and the Muslim community is not known.

But it is not only the Catholic Church that is resisting the secularization of Spanish society. Mohamed al Afifi, the spokesman for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Madrid, stated, “Spain is not a secular country like France, it is a non-denominational state. This is a crucial difference. And religious symbols are allowed.”¹¹³ The government’s plan to remove religious symbols from public buildings will surely spark further debate over the wearing of the hijab, especially in public schools.

Although the government has recognized religious freedoms for all of the population, various religious communities continue to face discrimination. Leaders of both the Muslim and Jewish communities have complained about the difficulties of securing permits and approvals for constructing new religious places. In 2006, the Seville Mosque Foundation claimed that “judicial hurdles” encountered while attempting to construct a mosque were due to a prejudice against Islam. A local neighborhood

¹¹¹ Juan G. Bedoya, “Bishops Lash Out at Plan to Secularize Life in Spain,” *El Pais*, May 26, 2008.

¹¹² Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report 2007.”

¹¹³ Antonio Jimenez Barca, “A Nation’s Headscarf Headache,” *El Pais*, February 20, 2008.

association had collected signatures to oppose the construction of the mosque and filed a judicial action. However, a local court in Seville ruled in favor of the Seville Mosque Foundation.¹¹⁴

Additionally, Muslim communities in Spain often complain about the lack of Muslim cemeteries. This problem has stemmed in part from an unwillingness of local communities to set aside land for Muslim cemeteries. Since September 2007, the Ministry of Justice has been working with local governments and the Muslim communities to address these concerns. Of greater concern is the insufficient number of Muslim teachers in the public schools. Spanish law requires public funding for teachers in Catholic, Islamic, Protestant, and Judaic studies, but the government has been unable to provide the number of Muslim teachers necessary for the large Muslim community.¹¹⁵

3. Social Tolerance

According to Xosé-Manoel Núñez, a Spanish scholar, “several surveys in the 1990s showed Spaniards to be less ‘racist’ than other European citizens (20 percent, against 36 percent of Germans and 49 percent of French),” but he notes that “these lower percentages obscure the fact that Spain’s rate of immigration was and is far less than in other EU countries.”¹¹⁶ With the rapid growth of immigration, especially by Muslims, these attitudes may have changed.

Most immigrants have come to Spain to take advantage of the economic opportunities, or to benefit from cultural ties, or both. But neither of these motives has prevented them from being subject to some form of discrimination. Some Spanish citizens blame the increased crime rates in Spain on the increase in the number of immigrants.¹¹⁷ While Spain has not released any official data on racially motivated

¹¹⁴ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Spain: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” (2007).

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Núñez, “History and Collective Memory of Migration in a Land of Migrants,” 230.

¹¹⁷ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Spain: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.”

crimes or violence, unofficial sources report a number of attacks against immigrants.¹¹⁸ Immigrants in Spain continue to face economic inequality, as immigrants typically earn much less than their Spanish counter-parts. Some Spaniards refuse to rent housing to immigrants while “abusive rent practices that lead to overcrowding, [and] unhealthy and insecure conditions” are common.¹¹⁹ Labor exploitation combined with “prohibitive house prices and property owners' racism, form a vicious circle that is difficult to break” and may lead to radicalization.¹²⁰

In 2004 and 2005, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) *SOS Racism* and *Movimiento contra la Intolerancia* reported eight violent attacks directed against Muslims and four attacks against their properties, such as the March 2005 spray painting of the Valencia Islamic Cultural Center with swastikas.¹²¹ But Muslims are not the only ones faced with such attacks. For instance, a Colombian couple was reportedly attacked by two Spanish police officers, who hurled racist, anti-immigrant slurs.¹²² Clearly, shared historical and cultural ties do not necessarily protect immigrants from discrimination and violence. However, Muslims face a greater threat of violence than do most other immigrant groups.

With the increase in Muslim immigration, as Muslims are the second largest religious group in Spain, the attitude of contempt toward immigrants has increased fourfold (from 8% to 32%) in the last eight years, according to CIS. The “least valued” immigrants are citizens of Moroccan nationality.¹²³ Moroccans make up the largest Muslim population in Spain as well as the majority of the population in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The fact that the Madrid train bombers were also Moroccans, residing in Spain, fuels anti-Moroccan sentiment and results in an identification of Islamic terrorists with Moroccans. Some Spaniards claim that the construction of 30 mosques

¹¹⁸ EUMC, *Perceptions of Discrimination and Islamophobia: Voices from Members of Muslim Communities in the European Union* (2006), 95-104.

¹¹⁹ Lorente and Alonso, “Shadow Report 2006: Racism in Spain,” 16.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 16.

¹²¹ EUMC, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia* (2006), 72.

¹²² Ibid., 104.

¹²³ Lorente and Alonso, “Shadow Report 2006: Racism in Spain,” 11.

during the 1990s and “dense communities of migrants from North Africa” (i.e., Muslims) were responsible for helping the development of Islamic terrorists in Spain.¹²⁴

Fifty-eight percent of respondents in Spain to a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey indicated that “being a devout Muslim was incompatible with modern society” and 80 percent felt that Islam did not respect women. These views may be signs that Muslims are seen as a threat to Spanish society and values.¹²⁵ However, in light of the increasing secularization of Spain, these attitudes may be more a rejection of religion than of Muslims.

The issues over types of Islamic dress, like the hijab (headscarf), have caused conflict between elements of Spanish society and the Muslim community. In November 2006 a Muslim woman was attacked and beaten for wearing a hijab. During the attack she was called a “moor,” despite the fact that she was a recent Spanish convert to Islam.¹²⁶ More recently, the People’s Party (PP) announced a plan to ban wearing the headscarf in public schools, with the exception of the predominantly Muslim enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The PP also proposed requiring Muslim girls to attend gymnastic classes; allowing male doctors to examine Muslim women; and requiring Muslim females to remove their headscarves for identification photos.¹²⁷

While the People’s Party failed to win the March 2008 elections, commentators wrote that its apparent intention was to gain support by exploiting anti-Muslim sentiments among the working class, especially due to a declining economy, in low-income neighborhoods.¹²⁸ It is important to note that following the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, there was only a slight increase in anti-Muslim threats and attacks. As

¹²⁴ Jose Maria Ortuno Aix, “Report on Islamophobia in Spain,” in Jocelyne Cesari (ed.) *Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe -Muslims in Western Europe After 9/11: Why the Term Islamophobia is More a Predicament than an Explanation* (Submission to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security, 6th PCRD of European Commission, 1 June 2006), pp. 273-274.

¹²⁵ European Observatory for Racism as cited by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report 2007.”

¹²⁶ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Spain: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.”

¹²⁷ “Debate about integration of Muslims rages in Spain,” *DPA*, 11 February 2008.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*,

Kamal Rahmouni, the president of a Moroccan immigrants association, observed, “the reaction of Spanish society” to the bombings was “very mature.”¹²⁹ The fact that there have been no major backlashes for the 11 March 2004 attacks would support his statement.

B. IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES

In contrast with leaders of the People’s Party, the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has stressed his view that the social and economic roots of terrorism must be addressed in order to prevent terrorism in Spain and in Islamic countries.¹³⁰ As a result, Spain does not have any explicit policies directed toward anti-radicalization efforts. Instead it has focused its efforts to prevent Islamic terrorism on integration measures. These efforts are meant to address the social and economic inequalities that may lead to radicalization. These integration efforts are closely linked to programs to promote multiculturalism and diversity for Spaniards and in Spain’s autonomous communities, or states.

The federalized system of Spanish government is due to recognition that regional identities have long been an important part of the make up of Spain. The Spanish republic had granted the regions autonomy in 1936, but Franco removed this autonomy as part of his push for nationalism. Minorities in Spain, most based on their regional identification like the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians, suffered from Franco’s nationalist policies. Knowledge of Spanish became compulsory and non-Spanish customs were banned.

As part of the democratization process following Franco’s death, the authors of the 1978 Spanish Constitution created the current system of seventeen autonomous communities, based on historical identities or culturally unique characteristics. At the same time, the Constitution recognizes “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation” and

¹²⁹ Kamal Rahmouni quoted in, “Spanish Muslims at crossroads - integration or exclusion,” *Monsters and Critics*, 13 February 2008.

¹³⁰ Paul Belkin, *Spain: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, RS22615 (Washington, DC; United States: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 4.

“guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.”¹³¹ In order to preserve the unity of Spain, multiculturalism is an imperative. This regional multiculturalism has possibly made it easier to incorporate immigrants and their distinct customs into Spanish society.

Since taking office in March 2004, Zapatero’s Socialist government has sought an even more multicultural society, an approach that might be described as a middle ground between France’s assimilation and Britain’s parallel society version of multiculturalism. Prior to the 11 March 2004 attacks, the Muslim presence in Spain was considered primarily an immigration problem. Immigration, terrorism and unemployment are the three topics that have tended to dominate the public discourse. Zapatero’s government has emphasized the need to integrate the Muslim population.¹³² This has made it easy for Spain to adhere to EU standards.

One of the most important changes that the government made in dealing with immigration has been institutional. It moved Immigration Affairs from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. At the same time, the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration and the Director General of the Ministry for the Integration of Immigrants were created.¹³³ The intent was to move immigration away from being viewed as a policing issue to creating direct links between immigration and integration into the labor market. This new emphasis was intended to support the integration of socially disadvantaged groups while filling employment gaps.¹³⁴

Part of this new approach was the May 2005 large-scale regularization, which provided legal residency for immigrants working in Spain. Illegal immigration and the drug trade provide large recruiting bases and financing for Islamic terrorists.¹³⁵ The focus was on illegal immigrants who currently held jobs in order to bring them out of the

¹³¹ Constitution of Spain.

¹³² Paul Gallis (Ed.), *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, RL33166 (Washington, DC; United States: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 41.

¹³³ Corcoran, “Local Responses to a New Issue: Integrating Immigrants in Spain,” 247.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 247.

¹³⁵ Anthony Celso, “The Tragedy of Al-Andalus: The Madrid Terror Attacks and the Islamization of Spanish Politics,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Summer 2005), 87.

underground economies. This regularization was directed at the approximately 800,000 illegal immigrants residing in Spain at the time.¹³⁶ As Muslims of Moroccan origin make up the largest illegal immigrant population (about 120,000), the process was an important way to make them part of the mainstream society and to remove fears of arrest and deportation back to Morocco. It would also make Spain more secure by bringing these Muslims out into the open where they could be more easily monitored.

However, the plan drew sharp criticism from the PP, which argued that regularization would only encourage more illegal immigration to Spain. This fear was realized in October 2004, when hundreds of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa stormed the border fences around Ceuta and Mellila, resulting in the shooting deaths of fourteen by Moroccan police.¹³⁷

The Spanish government has also worked with Spain's two major Islamic groups in order to facilitate Muslim integration. The Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI) and the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain (UCIDE) joined together as the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE). This was in conjunction with the signing of bilateral agreements with the Spanish government in 1992. The agreements provided the Protestant, Jewish and Islamic faiths with "certain tax benefits and gave civil validity to weddings performed by the religious groups" and permitted the groups to place teachers in schools and chaplains in hospitals and prisons.¹³⁸ Additionally, the government recognized Muslim holidays and allowed Friday afternoons off from work, with pay, to attend religious services. One problem that has often been noted is that the CIE represents only a small number of registered Muslim organizations in the country. This may affect the degree to which Muslims feel that they are being represented and the perceived validity within the Muslim community of any agreements between the CIE and the Spanish government.

¹³⁶ Corcoran, "Local Responses to a New Issue: Integrating Immigrants in Spain," 247.

¹³⁷ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, 41.

¹³⁸ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2007."

In 2005 the government-funded Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence, part of the Ministry of Justice, began providing funds to religious minorities to promote religious equality and dialogue. The funds can be used for cultural, educational, or social integration programs but not religious activities. As of 2007, \$6.2 million had been allocated for the fund. The Foundation even financed the creation and printing of the first Spanish textbook on Islam for use by first-grade students, with editions for other grades planned.¹³⁹

It is important to note that it has not been necessary for Spain to introduce new antiterrorism laws. Spain has been dealing with Basque terrorism for a long time. As such, it has already developed laws to support its antiterrorism efforts. It has applied those same laws to the new threat of Islamic terrorism. Even though the primary focus of the Zapatero government has been on increasing immigrant integration, it has also taken security measures to combat potential Islamic terrorism. Since the Madrid bombings, the Ministry of the Interior has increased its numbers of antiterrorism operators; and the Guardia Civil, the national police, have increased their number of agents dedicated to collecting information on Islamic terrorist groups.¹⁴⁰ A special task force of police and intelligence officers was established for the purpose of keeping “tabs on Muslim neighborhoods and prison mosques.”¹⁴¹ Spanish officials are particularly concerned about Islamic terrorist recruiting efforts in Ceuta and Melilla, due primarily to the large number of Moroccans and the poor economic and social conditions in these enclaves.¹⁴²

Security organizations are attempting to identify “jihadist supporters,” but the sheer number of “garage mosques” led by imams with unknown qualifications and ideologies makes it a daunting task.¹⁴³ The reason for the large number of informal mosques lies with the difficulties faced in building mosques. In 2004, the Minister of the

¹³⁹ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report 2007.”

¹⁴⁰ Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 4 (July – August 2005), 126-127.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁴² Belkin, *Spain: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 4.

¹⁴³ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, 41.

Interior proposed requiring that the informal mosques be registered and that their imams be identified and their teaching specified. This proposal evoked a serious backlash from the Muslim community, so it was dropped.¹⁴⁴

In an effort to prevent prisons from becoming a place of radicalization, Muslim convicts are dispersed to various prisons throughout Spain. While this was a standard anti-terrorism strategy, following the recommendations from the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on M-11 that Muslim detainees suspected of involvement with that terrorist attack be dispersed, it became a general policy for all Muslim prisoners in Spain.¹⁴⁵ The Committee also proposed that Muslim “preventive detainees,” those detained prior to a crime being carried out or suspected of planning future terrorist activity, have reduced visits and movement. Muslims therefore effectively lose their presumption of innocence. This has created a lot of hostility among the Muslim community, especially because most preventive detainees are released without ever being charged.¹⁴⁶

These seemingly arbitrary arrests undermine the government’s efforts to promote integration. They lend credibility to the impression among Muslims that the government harbors anti-Muslim sentiments, and this estranges the Muslim community. This can only further strengthen feelings that Muslims are not welcome in Spain and may encourage radicalization. However, the Zapatero government faces a tough situation. It must reconcile its “security imperatives with the need to assimilate [minorities into mainstream society] and protect the rights of Spain’s Muslim minority.”¹⁴⁷

C. CONCLUSION

Spain has worked hard to integrate its religious and ethnic minorities into the greater Spanish society. Its efforts to promote the development of a multicultural society appear more in line with EU efforts than those of most other EU member states. Spain

¹⁴⁴ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, 41-42.

¹⁴⁵ Aix, “Report on Islamophobia in Spain,” 276.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 276.

¹⁴⁷ Celso, “The Tragedy of Al-Andalus,” 93.

continues to have a degree of discrimination and violence against Muslims, and immigrants in general, as do all EU member states. However, given the size of the immigrant population in Spain and the comparatively low number of incidents, the problems do not appear to be widespread. But there are some detractors. Anthony Celso, the author of several articles about Islamic terrorism and its impact on nation states, argues that the Spanish government's commitment to multiculturalism and the legalization of illegal immigrants will exacerbate an "already precarious security situation."¹⁴⁸ Celso sees current Spanish policies as flawed in that there is a "dangerous disconnect between political idealism and a very dangerous security situation."¹⁴⁹ Thus, he evidently views Muslim immigrants more as a threat than a benefit.

Spain needs immigrants, however. It has the second lowest birth rate in the European Union after Germany and has an aging population. Spain's historical ties with Islam and its territories in North Africa make it an attractive option for Muslim immigrants. It remains to be seen if Spain's economic slowdown will diminish immigration levels, but its Muslim population will probably continue to grow. The regularization of illegal immigrants may attract more illegal immigrants, but it demonstrates that Spain recognizes that it must do something to integrate them into society and to prevent them from turning to crime. However, addressing the social and economic roots of terrorism in Spain will not stop all radicalization.

Spain's multiculturalism efforts appear to be effective in protecting its autonomous communities while integrating them into Spanish society, so they will likely work for integrating Muslims and other immigrants. Spain is attempting to provide its Muslim community the same opportunities and benefits that all others enjoy. Religious and political participation allows Muslims a voice in society and helps provide a method of redress. Some fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as Salafists or Wahabists, may reject Spanish efforts to integrate them, but nothing short of an Islamic Spain would satisfy them. Spain treads a fine line. It already faces a Basque separatist movement,

¹⁴⁸ Celso, "The Tragedy of Al-Andalus," 87.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 101.

with some lesser independence movements in other regions. Too much multiculturalism could lead to the loss of a united Spanish identity.

Internal political developments may affect current Spanish efforts to integrate Muslims and immigrants. The Socialist party may be voted out of power in the 2012 elections, and the conservative People's Party (PP) has not demonstrated an interest in the integration of immigrants, and especially Muslims, into Spanish society. With its emphasis on a nationalist identity, close ties to the Catholic Church, and anti-immigration views, the PP is not likely to maintain many of the Socialist Party's multicultural efforts directed at immigrant and Muslim integration. Party leader Mariano Rajoy has already stated his fear that high immigrant unemployment is threatening to bring about a return to the days when Spaniards picked French grapes to survive economically.¹⁵⁰

This situation illustrates the need for a common European Union strategy for integrating Muslim minorities into European society. This would provide a common thread to help guide future Spanish policies towards Muslim and immigrant integration. Spanish policy lacks specific anti-radicalization measures. Moreover, the current Spanish emphasis on multiculturalism to prevent Muslim radicalization is subject to substantial revision with potential changes in political leadership. A common EU strategy would provide more stability and would probably be less subject to the changing whims of popular opinion.

¹⁵⁰ Araceli Arias, "Spanish Party Leader Criticizes Immigrants," *El Pais*, 18 September 2008.

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IV. DENMARK'S ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

The recent waves of Muslim immigrants to Denmark have posed a challenge for the people and government of that country. This could be considered surprising due to the high levels of tolerance for which the Danes are known. Yet the September 2005 and February 2008 controversies over the cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed and the June 2008 attack on the Danish embassy in Afghanistan demonstrate that something is amiss. The Danes have become concerned over the potential threat of Islamic terrorism in their country. This raises many questions: Why does a country as tolerant of others as Denmark need to worry about Islamic terrorism? How is Denmark trying to prevent the radicalization of its Muslim residents? Are these efforts working? Most importantly, how do these efforts relate to the EU's anti-radicalization efforts?

Are Danish assimilation policies an effective method for preventing the radicalization of its Muslims and other immigrant communities? Denmark has taken an assimilationist approach to the integration of its immigrants into the mainstream society, and it is important to understand what the Danish government is trying to accomplish. Due to its reputation for tolerance, Denmark provides an important case study in how European Union states are dealing with the growing numbers of Muslims within their societies. As a member of the EU, it has the obligation to meet EU standards but it also has a great deal of flexibility in how it achieves those standards. As a result, Denmark provides an example of assimilationist policies to prevent the radicalization of Muslim minorities. This chapter demonstrates that, although Denmark's efforts to meet EU guidelines and policies have been successful, the Danes may have created conditions for even greater radicalization of their Muslim communities.

A. TOLERANCE

Tolerance is an important part of democracy. Intolerance is considered to be the antithesis of a democracy because it limits the rights of the individual citizens within the democracy. European democracies have long promoted religious and social tolerance as a means of protecting their citizens and maintaining social cohesion within their states. It

is difficult to think of a European state that has had a stronger reputation for tolerance than Denmark. Danes, as a whole, are usually characterized as having an “easy egalitarian way” about them.¹⁵¹

Catholic and Jewish minorities have been successfully integrated into the overwhelmingly Protestant Danish population. This religious tolerance stretches back to the religious conflicts following the Protestant Reformation. In 1650 the Danish King Frederick III established the town of Fredericia, for both Huguenot refugees and Jews, which was for centuries the longest lasting Jewish community in Jutland.¹⁵² Denmark was the only German-occupied country in Europe that was able to save the majority of its Jewish population from the Nazis.¹⁵³ More recently, Denmark has been supportive of both Israel and the Palestinians despite the conflict between them and “touts itself as the world's biggest net contributor per capita of foreign aid.”¹⁵⁴

Many Americans look to Denmark's liberal drug policies and lack of general law enforcement as evidence that the Danes are more tolerant than most Americans. An example of this was the Christiania neighborhood in Copenhagen. The neighborhood “was an informal symbol of Danish tolerance — a leafy district dotted with hippie communes and stalls where people could openly buy and smoke marijuana despite nominal laws against it.”¹⁵⁵ Yet, this neighborhood was one of the scenes of Copenhagen's youth riots in February 2008. The rioters protested the re-printing of the Prophet Mohammed cartoons. In the wake of the riots, the Justice Minister called for a zero tolerance approach for dealing with the rioters.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.

¹⁵² Norman Berdichevsky, “A Monument to Tolerance and A Glaring Example of a No-Go Area in Denmark,” *New English Review*, July 2008.

¹⁵³ Svenning Dalgaard and Klaus Dalgaard, “The Right to Offend: The Causes and Consequences of the ‘Danish Cartoon Affair,’” *RUSI Journal*, vol. 151, no. 2 (April 2006), 29.

¹⁵⁴ Dan Bilefsky, “Cartoon Dispute Prompts Crisis of Identity for Liberal Denmark,” *International Herald Tribune*, February 12, 2006.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ “State to Show ‘Zero Tolerance’ to Rioters,” *The Copenhagen Post*, February 21, 2008.

The sweeping generalization of high levels of social tolerance is usually attributed to Scandinavians as a whole, but is untrue. While the Danes may be tolerant concerning many societal differences, such as the acceptance of homosexuality, they have been less tolerant in other areas, especially immigration. Some Danes have been critical of Danish intolerance: “Start dressing f--ked up and you'll see Danish tolerance...in Denmark everybody should be the same, think the same, and talk the same.”¹⁵⁷ A study on Danish tolerance by Oystein Gaasholt and Lise Togeby found that Danes, on an individual level, tend to be tolerant of different ethnic groups based on their levels of education. The better educated tend to be more tolerant, perhaps due to increased cognitive skills.¹⁵⁸ Gaasholt and Togeby's conclude that

Intolerance among students is anchored in political beliefs going against the grain of the values on which democracies of the Danish type rest. When students confess intolerance, it is not by virtue of being less coherent in their thinking than are their tolerant peers, but by virtue of having taken a position far to the right of the ideology that underpins the Scandinavian welfare states and, in consequence of such a position, embrace illiberal values.¹⁵⁹

Thus, based on their conclusion, Danes who are less tolerant of other ethnicities are rejecting the liberal values of Danish society. However, this conclusion about intolerance towards immigrants in Denmark does not explain why 79 per cent of Danes responded to a poll saying that they consider that “more interaction with the Muslim world would increase its threat”¹⁶⁰ or why in the May/June 2006 opinion poll for the conservative *Berlingske Tidende* newspaper 59 per cent of the respondents answered no to the question, “Are Muslims an advantage to Denmark?”¹⁶¹

It has been argued that issues of Muslim integration into mainstream society are being stirred up by media and political interests. Anders Jerichow argues that the Muslim

¹⁵⁷ As quoted in, “A Blast from the Past: An Interview with Amdi Petersens Armé”, Asice.net Hardcore E-zine (July 2007).

¹⁵⁸ Oystein Gaasholt and Lise Togeby, “Interethnic Tolerance, Education, and Political Orientation: Evidence from Denmark,” *Political Behavior*, vol. 17, no. 3 (September 1995), 270.

¹⁵⁹ Gaasholt and Togeby, “Interethnic Tolerance, Education, and Political Orientation,” 277.

¹⁶⁰ “Islamophobia is Rife Claims Study” *The Copenhagen Post*, January 31, 2008.

¹⁶¹ Anders Jerichow, “Wake-up in the Danish Ghetto,” *Index on Censorship*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2006), 43.

community has long been a part of Danish society but the media is still engaging in a debate on the merits of Muslim immigration. It has gotten to the point that even “second generation immigrants,” the children of Muslim immigrant parents, are still being treated as outsiders even though they are Danish citizens.¹⁶² Many Muslim immigrants believe that certain issues, such as “honor killings,” female circumcision, and forced marriages, are portrayed as “inherently Muslim rather than as unacceptable consequences of certain patriarchal cultural traditions.”¹⁶³ In the early 1980s and 1990s, if immigrants were mentioned in the media it was as a problem, with high unemployment rates, high crime, or developing ethnic ghettos.¹⁶⁴ More importantly, Muslims were always defined in religious terms but not as a threat to society; the controversies over the Prophet Mohammed cartoons in September 2005 and February 2008 and the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004 have changed that.

Many people, including many Danes, view the reaction throughout the Islamic world to the publishing of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by *Jyllands-Posten*, in September 2005, as a sign of the incompatibility of Islam with democratic ideals. Currently, seven Muslim organizations are planning to bring a civil suit against the *Jyllands-Posten* for libel due to the printing of the Mohammed cartoons to the Danish Supreme Court.¹⁶⁵ While this is a legitimate expression of their civil rights under Danish and EU laws, many Danes are likely to perceive this as an attempt to silence free speech and the “contrarianism” that defines Danes.¹⁶⁶

Meanwhile, the 2006 *Annual Report on the Situation Regarding Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU* by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) found that from 2000 to 2005 there was an increase in

¹⁶² Jerichow, “Wake-up in the Danish Ghetto,” 43.

¹⁶³ EUMC, *Perceptions of Discrimination and Islamophobia: Voices from Members of Muslim Communities in the European Union* (2006), 37.

¹⁶⁴ Anders Jerichow, “Wake-up in the Danish Ghetto,” 43.

¹⁶⁵ “Mohammed Case Heads for Supreme Court,” *The Copenhagen Post*, July 31, 2008.

¹⁶⁶ Svenning Dalgaard, “The Right to Offend,” 29.

reported racist crime in Denmark and seven other EU states.¹⁶⁷ But there is a question of whether there was an actual increase in racist crime or just better reporting. According to the EUMC, Danish police reported to PET (Danish Civil Security Service) a total of 32 “racist/religious” incidents in 2004.¹⁶⁸ For the period of 1 January-13 October 2005, the Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination (DACoRD) recorded 22 Islamophobic incidents in Denmark.¹⁶⁹ A number of the incidents DACoRD listed had not been reported to the PET. The PET database, however, does not categorize incidents as anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic, or as any other specific type of hate crime, but this is a small number of incidents for a country of over five million people. Danish Muslims nonetheless perceive the situation to be bad enough that, as Jytte Klausen states, “several Danish and Dutch Muslim parliamentarians confessed to me that they had thought about...migrating to the UK, or alternatively to the USA.”¹⁷⁰

Danish attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims, in general, are difficult to categorize. According to the EUMC in 2001, Denmark had a comparatively high proportion of intolerant citizens (20 percent), but it also had the highest number of “actively tolerant” citizens in the EU (33 percent).¹⁷¹ At the same time, Denmark had a relatively high level of support for social policies that improved co-existence, to include anti-discrimination measures and programs for promoting cultural understanding, while Danes were also the most likely in the EU to blame social problems on minorities.¹⁷² It is this schizophrenia among the Danes that makes it difficult to determine if Danish efforts to integrate immigrants into society have been successful. This can only make assessing and improving anti-radicalization efforts more difficult.

¹⁶⁷ EUMC, *The Annual Report on the Situation Regarding Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU* (2006), 16.

¹⁶⁸ EUMC, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia* (2006), 67.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 68. This is the most recent published data available.

¹⁷⁰ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 55.

¹⁷¹ As referenced by Per Mouritsen, “The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation,” 75.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

B. IMMIGRATION & INTEGRATION POLICIES

The Muslim community in Denmark is primarily an immigrant one. That simply means that Muslims are a recent addition to Danish society. But this is an important distinction for most ethnic Danes. The Danes did not experience extensive contact with Muslims until the late 1960s when labor shortages forced them to seek outside Europe for workers. The majority of Muslim immigrants came from Pakistan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Despite the immigration freeze in 1973, liberal family reunification programs allowed the influx to continue. In the 1980s and 1990s liberal immigration policies allowed in large numbers of refugees from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Kosovo, and Somalia.¹⁷³ In some cases, entire villages followed previous migrants into Denmark and settled in the same areas.¹⁷⁴

As of 1987, there were about 128,000 foreign citizens in Denmark out of a population of about five million. This made immigrants only 2.5 percent of the total population and made Denmark one of the “most ethnically homogenous countries in Western Europe.”¹⁷⁵ That has changed over the last twenty years. In January 1999, it was estimated that there were 120,000 Muslims in Denmark.¹⁷⁶ It is currently (2007) estimated that 8.4 percent (452,095) of the total Danish population of 5.4 million are immigrants and their descendents; of that there are about 200,000 Muslims in Denmark.¹⁷⁷ According to the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs “Statistical Overview – Population Statistics on Foreigners 2007,” as of “1 January 2007, there were 56,140 Turkish immigrants and descendants, corresponding to about 12 per cent” and “the second-largest group is from Iraq and constituted 27,370 people at 1 January 2007, corresponding to 5.7 per cent of the total group of foreigners in

¹⁷³ Mouritsen, “The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation,” 74.

¹⁷⁴ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 29.

¹⁷⁵ Carl-Ulrik Schierup, “Immigrants and Immigrant Policy in Denmark and Sweden: Failed Assimilation Versus Corporatist Multiculturalism,” *International Review of Comparative Public Policy*, vol. 1 (1989), 224.

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Factsheet Denmark” (February 2006), 1.

¹⁷⁷ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark* (2007), 5.

Denmark.”¹⁷⁸ While the “Statistical Overview” offers no estimates about specific numbers of Islamic immigrants and descendents, such estimates can be inferred based on the country of origin. Muslims make up the largest group of all minority faith communities in the country. Turks and Iraqis are the largest immigrant groups. No longer is Denmark the homogenous country that it once was.

In Denmark, Muslims are concentrated primarily in the three largest cities: Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Odense. The majority of Denmark’s Muslims reside within the Copenhagen area. It is estimated that about 70 percent live within Copenhagen County, with the remainder scattered throughout the country.¹⁷⁹ This concentration is typical and understandable as new immigrants want to live near people with whom they share commonalities. The problem in Denmark and most other EU countries is that these neighborhoods become “ghettos” which, many argue, block assimilation into the host society.

The Danish government has put a lot of emphasis on immigration and integration policies in order to meet its EU obligations and to protect its cultural heritage. In some ways these two ends are at odds as, it might be argued, EU policy is directed at transcending nationalistic and cultural identities in order to provide basic rights and privileges to all citizens and immigrants while promoting economic cooperation and freedoms. In September 2000, Karen Jespersen, then the Danish Minister of the Interior, who is currently the Minister of Welfare, expressed a clear opinion in regard to immigrants and Danish society. “I could never under any circumstances live with a multicultural society in which the cultures are positioned equally.” Furthermore, she said, “in my opinion it is wrong to juxtapose Muslim values and Danish values.”¹⁸⁰ Danes want their immigrants to seamlessly integrate into society so that there is only a Danish identity, and Danish values predominate. This view has shaped Danish immigration and integration policy.

¹⁷⁸ Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, “Statistical Overview - Population Statistics on Foreigners 2007,” 5.

¹⁷⁹ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 6.

¹⁸⁰ Jespersen quoted by Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 36.

To understand this policy it is important to understand who is considered a Dane. According to Statistics Denmark, “a person is considered a Dane if one of his or her parents is a Danish national and was born in Denmark.”¹⁸¹ An immigrant is someone who was born abroad and his descendent is therefore a foreigner born in Denmark. Unlike in the United States, being born in Denmark does not grant automatic citizenship. It does not even grant any preferential rights to acquire Danish citizenship.¹⁸² This distinction, however, does not prevent someone from applying for naturalization. It serves primarily as a census tool. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether Danish society, at large, recognizes an individual or group as being “Danish.”

The Danish Government has tied immigration with integration. Once an immigrant is granted residence status, he is, among other things, expected to: a) complete an introduction program as proscribed by the Integration Act; and b) pass a Danish language competency test. Before these two steps can be taken, however, the applicant must show that he has: a) not received a prison sentence of two years or more for a serious crime; and b) not defaulted on any debt in the public sector.¹⁸³ Since July 2006 the Danish government has tightened immigration laws, as a result of the election of the far right Danish People’s Party (DPP) into power. Requirements to gain permanent residency were added. The DPP swept into power largely on an anti-immigration platform. It created an integration exam and a requirement for 2 ½ years of full time employment as part of sweeping changes to Danish immigration laws.¹⁸⁴ However, this has not been without controversy and opposition from immigrants and the political left.

The Danish government’s current plan to “extend the Danish test for immigrants coming to Denmark under the family reunification scheme” is being challenged.¹⁸⁵ Opponents and critics argue that EU family reunification laws override the stricter Danish laws. The DPP maintains that the government must act to prevent Danish law, and by

¹⁸¹ Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, “International Migration and Denmark: SOPEMI Report to OECD” (November 2006), 18.

¹⁸² Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 12.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁸⁴ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 43.

¹⁸⁵ “EU Rules Cast Doubt on Immigration Test,” *The Copenhagen Post*, July 29, 2008.

extension Danish sovereignty, from being undermined by EU law. The Liberal party holds that the government needs to investigate whether EU law overrides Danish immigration policy, writ large. This is all due to claims that the Danish 24 year rule violates the EU regulations on free movement of labor. The 24 year rule requires “that in order for the spouse of a Dane to immigrate to Denmark, both must be at least 24 (unless the non-Dane is a citizen of an EU country).” If the requirement is not met, “the couple must live together abroad, or confine their relationship to the three month-periods a Danish tourist visa allows the foreigner to stay in Denmark.”¹⁸⁶

It is important to note that the Integration Act does not apply to “aliens who are nationals of a Member State of the European Community” or those “who are nationals of another Nordic country.”¹⁸⁷ The reasons for the exemption of citizens of EU member states are obvious; Denmark is a member of the EU. The exemption of citizens of other Nordic countries is due to shared cultural heritage and political agreements. Danes feel that they have more in common with Nordic immigrants than with any other group. Shared cultural heritage, religion and languages are important parts of uniting and integrating different groups. Muslim immigrants to Denmark obviously lack a Nordic cultural heritage, but according to Danish law in order to become Danes they must renounce their previous citizenship as dual citizenship is not allowed.¹⁸⁸ This can create a “disconnection” from either society which sets the conditions for potential radicalization.

Denmark has tried to make up for the lack of a common cultural, religious, or language heritage through the manner in which it integrates immigrants into Danish society. Children of immigrants, even those who do not have Danish citizenship, are offered free education. The Danish curriculum, however, requires knowledge of the Danish language to participate in the educational system. To accommodate those who do

¹⁸⁶ Bolette Kornum, “The 24 Year Hitch,” *The Copenhagen Post*, July 24, 2008.

¹⁸⁷ Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs “Consolidation Act No. 839 of 5 September 2005”, *Consolidation of the Act on Integration of Aliens in Denmark (the Integration Act)* (28 June 2001), 1.

¹⁸⁸ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 12.

not speak Danish, after hours courses in native languages are offered or immigrants are authorized to establish their own schools with government funding. Several Muslim groups have created private Islamic schools.¹⁸⁹ But there have been problems, including a lack of recognition for educational achievements in the country of emigration, discrimination in finding apprenticeships, and even frequent absences among migrant children.¹⁹⁰

Other government programs aimed at helping immigrants, such as Denmark's generous social welfare programs, are accessible to immigrants and citizens alike. While immigrants can not vote in national parliamentary elections, they have a voice in local government. Since 1981, the right to vote in Municipal Council elections has been extended to all foreign nationals.¹⁹¹ This at least allows immigrants, including Muslims, to have a say in local political and social matters. It allows for an outlet to voice concerns and to express opinions.

Low rent housing provided to immigrants under Danish integration policy led to some problems. It created a number of "ethnic ghettos." To deal with concerns over the creation of these ethnic ghettos, local government leaders were able to push for the creation of a national housing committee in the early 1990s. The committee developed a number of proposals to renew deprived neighborhoods and thereby encourage native Danes to return to the areas, but its primary purpose was to spread minorities more evenly throughout the country and remove the "ghettos."¹⁹²

In August 2001, the Ministry of the Interior commissioned a research institute to conduct a study on integration in Denmark. The results of this study were published as "The Integration of Foreigners in the Danish Society." The research institute determined that there were seven social and cultural criteria necessary for successful integration. These seven criteria are as follows:

¹⁸⁹ Jan Hjarno, "Muslims in Denmark" in *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, eds. Gerd Nonneman, Tim Niblock, and Bogdan Szajkowski (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 1997), 292-293.

¹⁹⁰ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 17.

¹⁹¹ Jan Hjarno, "Muslims in Denmark", 292.

¹⁹² Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 25.

1) Danish skills and education – immigrants and their descendants should acquire such skills and education to succeed in the labor market and society;

2) Employment – foreigners (immigrants and their descendants) should be employed at the same rate as Danes and descendants should be able to find employment that is consistent with their qualifications;

3) Economic independence – foreigners should not be reliant on state or municipal financial aid;

4) Lack of discrimination – foreigners should not be discriminated against in society or the labor market;

5) Contact between foreigners and Danes – there should be common contact and interaction between people in everyday life;

6) Participation in political life – foreigners should participate as voters, representatives of the people and members of associations, but only Danish citizens can run for election and vote in parliamentary elections;

7) Fundamental values and norms – respect for democracy and the people's freedom of rights, participatory democracy, obeying the laws, equal rights and tolerance should be shared by all.¹⁹³

Incidentally, the research institute found that Denmark was far from achieving its goal but attributed some of the failure to deficiencies in meeting analogous criteria in the immigrants' home countries.

In the years following this report, Denmark has sought to increase the integration of its immigrant population. Part of this was a result of an increased concern over Islamic terrorism following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands on 2 November 2004. The 2002 amendments to the Integration Act have resulted in some significant

¹⁹³ The Ministry of the Interior, *The Integration of Foreigners in the Danish Society* (August 2001), 7-8.

changes with the aim of leading immigrants to become integrated into Danish society. The government hoped to create conditions to encourage immigrants to assimilate and to satisfy the concern of Danish citizens that immigrants were receiving but not contributing to social welfare benefits. Subsidies for mother-tongue education have been eliminated under the theory that it will force children to learn Danish faster and therefore integrate more quickly into the mainstream of Danish society.¹⁹⁴ The amendments were also intended to reduce immigration from non-Western countries, cap the amount of welfare benefits that an unemployed family is entitled to receive, deter economic refugees from seeking asylum in Denmark, and encourage immigrants to end their dependence on social welfare benefits, and remove control of funds for integration projects away from local civic organizations to the Ministry of Integration.

Serious problems remain unsolved. In regard to education, owing to deficiencies in their command of the Danish language, Muslim pupils remain at a disadvantage when compared to their Danish counterparts.¹⁹⁵ Immigrants, especially Muslims, have high unemployment rates. Owing in part to their unemployment problems and the removal of the social welfare benefits on which they relied, many Muslims have been disenchanted with Danish efforts towards integration.

At the same time, several radical Muslims have sought to hinder Danish integration efforts. Two prominent anti-integrationist preachers, Imam Ahmed Abdel Rahman (Abu Laban) and Ahmed Akkari, have led active campaigns against Muslims who seek to be integrated into Danish society. Naser Khader, a member of the Danish Social Liberal Party and a member of parliament, has been forced to live under police protection due to the death threats he has received from radical Muslims.¹⁹⁶

The cartoon controversy did have some positive effects on the Muslim community in regard to integration. The primary effect was to bring awareness of the situation to Denmark and allow a way for young Muslims to be heard. Prominent

¹⁹⁴ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 42.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁹⁶ Svenning Dalgaard, “The Right to Offend,” 30.

Muslim leaders who support integration were recognized, including Kamal Qureshi and Huseyin Arac, two other members of parliament. But there may be a representational problem, at least from the viewpoint of some Muslim observers. In 2006, there were only three Muslim members of parliament out of 179 seats. This is roughly 2 percent of parliament, but Muslims make up 4 percent of the population.¹⁹⁷ It is estimated that only half of the adult Muslims living in Denmark can vote in national elections, because only half of them have gained citizenship.¹⁹⁸ Due to the increase in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim stances by some left parties, such as the Danish Social Democrats (who have been stressing protection of national values against Islamic dilution) centrist Muslims are being forced to join “small parties in the center or on the left.”¹⁹⁹ Such developments dilute the voice of the Muslims and make it difficult for them to feel that they are truly part of – and welcomed – in Danish society.

C. ANTI-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

In the wake of the February 2008 reprinting of Prophet Mohammed cartoons, the bombing of its Embassy in Pakistan and participation in coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Denmark has experienced a rise in the threat of Islamic violence. In June 2008, the PET’s Center for Terroranalyse published its “Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark.” It concluded that “there are persons and circles that sympathize with and/or support groups that are involved in terrorist activities.”²⁰⁰ These individuals and groups adhere to “militant Islamist ideologies,” but more importantly, are willing to get involved in terrorist activities.²⁰¹ The report points to the arrest of three individuals in November 2007 for planning terrorist acts in Odense and the April 2007 case of a Danish-Moroccan individual who was convicted of providing “general guidance of terror

¹⁹⁷ Anders Jerichow, “Wake-up in the Danish Ghetto,” 44.

¹⁹⁸ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 21.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁰⁰ Center for Terrorism Analysis (CTA), “Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark” (2 June 2008), 1.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 1-3.

groups and propagation of material aimed at recruiting members for such groups.”²⁰² These events have helped to energize efforts to prevent the radicalization of Danish Muslims.

Jytte Klausen, a noted Danish-American scholar on integration and multiculturalism in Western Europe, has accused Denmark of being “the country with the least official interest in developing a dialogue with its Muslim residents.” As a result, “the consistent unwillingness...to engage in coordinating efforts with Muslims go[es] a long way to explain the comparative disarray of Danish Muslims.”²⁰³ Yet, the government has sought to increase dialogue with the Muslim community. On 13 February 2006, the Prime Minister, for the second time, met with a number of Muslim community and organization leaders. The intent was to encourage dialogue on integration and the situation of Muslims in Denmark.²⁰⁴ Four months later, however, the Danish Minister of Education, Bertel Haarder, in June 2006, supported indigenous Danish parents who wanted ethnically segregated classes in public schools in Copenhagen. Haarder promised a revision of the laws and regulations so that they would not stand in the way of the plan for segregated classes.²⁰⁵ While no apparent efforts at changing the anti-segregation laws have been pursued, Haarder’s stance reinforces the impression that the national government is not concerned with assimilating the immigrant populations into the greater society. Attempts at assimilation by the government will not be viewed as serious by the immigrant, especially Muslim, communities in this context.

In contrast with the national government, which is dominated by the anti-immigration, anti-globalization, and nationalistic views of the DPP, the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) has taken a different approach. The PET clearly sees radicalization as a primary threat to the security of Denmark. It has recognized that “a significant and increasing part of the militant extremists are young or very young men

²⁰² Center for Terrorism Analysis (CTA), “Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark,” 3.

²⁰³ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 41.

²⁰⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Factsheet Denmark” (February 2006), 2.

²⁰⁵ Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 43.

born and raised in the West.”²⁰⁶ These individuals are not connected to specific conflict zones, but perceive themselves to be “part of a world-wide Muslim community which, in their view, is being attacked.”²⁰⁷ This recognition has been influential in how the PET has dealt with the Muslim community.

As part of its anti-radicalization efforts, the PET has identified five categories of individuals from whom there is a risk of attempts using undemocratic or violent methods to reach their goals.

The first group consists of those who have sought asylum in Denmark or who have come as part of family reunifications. The concern is that some of these individuals may have been trained in terrorist training camps or that they may exert radical ideological influence or provide terrorist financing and support for terrorist acts in Denmark or abroad.²⁰⁸

The second category is composed of second and third generation immigrants who feel rejected by society, the media, or the labor market. The concern is that individuals who are poorly integrated into society, have failed in school, and have been in trouble with the authorities may be more susceptible to radical fundamentalist versions of Islam.²⁰⁹

The third category consists of young individuals who appear well integrated into society but are nonetheless attracted to radical, militant versions of Islam. These are the ones who are difficult to identify.

The fourth category consists of ethnic Danes who have converted to Islam. The concern is that these Danish nationals, due to their European appearance and identification, can move unrestrictedly and without raising suspicion.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶ Center for Terrorism Analysis (CTA), “Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark,” 4.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁰⁸ Danish Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2004-2005,” 15.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

The final category consists of ideologists. These are well educated individuals who seek to create an Islamic State or Caliphate and argue that Islam is incompatible with democracy.²¹¹ These people are of grave concern as they can use their freedom of speech to radicalize young Muslims.

Despite its role in conducting surveillance of Muslim communities, the PET has an excellent reputation and is trusted by ordinary Muslims. This is in contrast to the regular police, who have trouble even recruiting young Muslims.²¹² Much of PET's success has to do with its use of the community policing model, which has become common among Europe's police forces. The active involvement with the Muslim communities through meetings and cooperation has enabled police to develop positive relationships with them. As part of that effort, PET carries out "preventative talks" with individuals who may be involved in suspicious activities. These talks are intended to instruct "the persons in question about the current regulations within a specific area to avoid that they 'unintentionally' break the law."²¹³ PET will also "make people aware...that one of their personal contacts has connections to terrorism."²¹⁴ This can help deter potential future involvement in terrorism, but it also fosters a sense among Muslims that the government is not hostile towards them.

With the high number of immigrants and young Muslims in Danish prisons, the concern over the possible radicalization of Muslims in prison has increased. As prisons are often places where individuals seek religion, this has potentially severe consequences. Religious conversion in prison can lead towards further alienation from mainstream society and conflict.²¹⁵ Prisons are also polarizing environments where individuals join groups to cement their identity in relation to other groups of inmates.²¹⁶ This creates

²¹¹ Danish Security Intelligence Service, "Annual Report 2004-2005," 16.

²¹² Open Society Institute, *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report – Denmark*, 43.

²¹³ Danish Security Intelligence Service, "Annual Report 2003", 28.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

²¹⁵ J. Michael Waller, "Prison as Terrorist Breeding Grounds," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, volume I, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 30.

²¹⁶ Jon A. Olsen, *Radicalization in Danish Prisons*, Danish Institute for International Studies (March 2008), 2.

perfect conditions for young Muslims to be radicalized. In order to prevent this, the PET has been training prison staff how to identify individuals susceptible to the radicalization process.²¹⁷ The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) recommended that more well-qualified imams be recruited to serve in the prisons. According to the DIIS, providing better conditions for practicing Muslims would be one of the best ways to prevent radical Islam from spreading in Danish prisons.²¹⁸ It is not clear whether the DIIS recommendations will be adopted.

While the PET has taken an active role in anti-radicalization efforts, it is important to note that the Danish government is attempting to prevent radicalization through its integration efforts. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published “Factsheet Denmark” to highlight its efforts to integrate immigrants, especially Muslims, into society. It points to the adoption of the 2003 “Action Plan for the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Diversity and to Combat Racism” as one of its major achievements. The Action Plan was intended to ensure that there was room for diversity in Denmark. “It is crucial for the public to take an active part in creating an inclusive society with room for everyone and tolerance and respect for diversity.”²¹⁹

D. CONCLUSION

Despite Denmark’s attempts to integrate Muslims into the wider Danish society through legislation, it is difficult to determine how well these efforts have worked. Muslims continue to face discrimination in all aspects of society. Danish integration efforts appear to have failed in view of increased reporting of anti-Muslim discrimination, high unemployment among Muslims, and the impression among Muslims that the government is anti-immigrant. On paper, the Danish government has done a great job in passing legislation to protect immigrants and to integrate them into society in keeping with EU goals. There are, however, apparently some discrepancies between

²¹⁷ Olsen, *Radicalization in Danish Prisons*, 1.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

²¹⁹ Danish Government, *Action Plan for the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Diversity and to Combat Racism* (November 2003), 13.

what the Danish government says and what it does. What appear to be successful are the police efforts in dealing with the Muslim and immigrant communities. For example, the PET and local police efforts at community policing include meetings with local leaders and other arrangements to develop positive relationships with the community.

What effect does this have on Danish anti-radicalization efforts? The low level of arrests for terrorist activity suggests that the threat of Islamic violence is low in Denmark. Police efforts at community policing, local efforts to integrate Muslim communities, and the split nature of the Muslim community (it is divided by ethnic and national origin differences) are all factors that may help to prevent violence. However, some reports indicate that the February 2008 youth riots were caused by police “stop and search” practices. Danish anti-radicalization efforts have not successfully addressed some of the root causes of radicalization. As long as members of the Muslim community feel that they are not accepted in Danish society and afforded equal opportunities for work and education, the threat remains. The harsh tone of the Danish People’s Party towards immigrants and integration only serves to intensify those feelings.

V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMATION

The inability of the EU and its member states to develop a common strategy for integrating their Muslim minorities hampers the implementation of measures to counter Islamic radicalism. While Muslims remain sizeable minority populations within several European Union countries, they continue to face significant challenges, such as xenophobia, social and economic discrimination, and racism, in integrating into European societies. These challenges have been used by Al-Qaeda ideologues, like Ayman al Zawahiri, to argue that Western countries are systematically discriminating against Muslims.²²⁰

The demographics of Europe have been changing since the end of World War II. As the number of Muslims, including converts, in Europe continues to grow while the number of Christian Europeans declines, Europe may be forced to re-examine its identity. These demographic changes tend to increase the cleavages between Christians and Muslims in Europe. While Europeans are generally becoming more secular, widespread identification with Christianity persists. Some Europeans regard the rise of large populations of Muslims as a threat to Europe's Christian identity. At the same time, however, second- and third-generation Muslim youths are facing difficulties in their own self-identification. Young Muslims struggle to identify with European societies that, they believe, do not accept them, while also trying to identify with the religion and culture of their parents. The perceived social and economic discrimination and the feeling of not having a political voice may create a pool of recruits for Islamic radicalization.

In 2007, the German Marshall Fund and Compagnia di San Paolo survey asked, "In the next 10 years, how likely are you to be personally affected by the following threats?" The survey found that the perceived threat of Islamic terrorism, among the one thousand men and women 18 years of age and older that were surveyed, had increased

²²⁰ Fernando Reinares, *Towards a Social Characterisation of Jihadist Terrorism in Spain: Implications for Domestic Security and Action Abroad*, ARI 34/2006 (Madrid, Spain: Elcano Royal Institute, 2006), 8.

from 40 percent in 2005 to 59 percent in 2007. The European average increased by 15 percentage points, based on the twelve European countries surveyed.²²¹ The European Union recognizes that there remains a potential threat from Islamic radicalization in Europe, but it strives to protect the fundamental rights of all its residents, without regard to race or creed. In many ways the EU is the embodiment of the secularization trend underway throughout Europe. While the European Union understands that much of European culture and society has a Christian base, it has upheld certain ideas of the Enlightenment to guarantee the fundamental human rights of all residents. Ideologically the EU has attempted to transcend past disputes about religion, national identity, and culture and instead has sought to create a common – and secular – European identity. Since the EU must rely on consensus among its member states in policy-making in certain domains, it is limited in what it can achieve. This has constrained the EU’s anti-radicalization efforts.

The key aspects of the EU’s anti-radicalization measures have focused on encouraging the integration of immigrants into their host national society, while protecting their fundamental rights. The EU applies these efforts to all immigrants, not just Muslims, in order to prevent the potential radicalization of any minority group. Additionally, the EU has sought to prevent Muslims from being stigmatized as potential terrorists. The Race Directive of 2000 from the Council of the European Community cautions against the use of potentially discriminatory language if it “takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”²²² Linking Muslims or Islam to terrorism might be seen as a violation of this Directive. “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism” provides an ideological structure for EU-wide anti-radicalization efforts, but it does not specify concrete policies to be applied across the EU to prevent radicalization. In fact, the strategy states that “the

²²¹ German Marshall Fund and Compagnia di San Paolo, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007*, 8. Polling was conducted in the United States and 12 European Countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

²²² Council of the European Community, “Council Directive: Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin,” 2000/43/EC (29 June 2000), 24.

challenge of combating radicalization and terrorist recruitment lies primarily with the Member States, at a national, regional and local level...[T]he challenge of radicalism and means to counter it vary greatly in each Member State.” Having a common understanding of a situation is not the same thing as pursuing common solutions. At the same time the strategy states that it “allows Member States to take forward work at [the] national level based on a common understanding of the factors and of principles and actions for countering them.”²²³

As a result, each member state must devise its own initiatives, so long as they meet EU legal standards. This has resulted in a variety of measures taken by member states. National efforts are subject to change in accordance with popular opinion and political leadership.

Spain and Denmark serve as clear examples of the divergent ways in which EU member states have sought to prevent the radicalization of their Muslim minorities. Spain has not implemented any specific anti-radicalization efforts. Instead, it has sought to create a multicultural society, in which all groups could participate without sacrificing their individual cultural identities. This effort reflects many of the ideals of the EU in protecting human rights while respecting all cultures. These multicultural efforts may derive in part from reactions to previous experiences with centrally enforced nationalism and the suppression of minority and regional cultural identities. Spain has sought to make Muslims feel that they are welcome in Spanish society by establishing dialogue with various Muslim organizations. In conjunction with upholding freedom of religion, Spain has also promoted equal opportunity measures in education and employment. Unfortunately, Spain’s multiculturalism efforts run the risk of destabilizing the country by weakening a common national identity. Spain already faces a Basque separatist Denmark wants its Muslims to develop a Danish cultural identity. Legislatively, Denmark has passed the “Action Plan for the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Diversity and to Combat Racism” to ensure that there is room for diversity in an overwhelmingly homogenous society. However, the most important efforts have been

²²³ Council of the European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism,” 14781/1/05, 6.

undertaken by the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET). The PET has identified specific categories of individuals who are at risk for radicalization. Using these categories to focus its efforts, the PET has increased its surveillance of certain elements of the Muslim community. At the same time, however, it has increased its engagement with the local Muslim community. This has decreased tensions between Muslims and the security services.movement and a rising Catalanian one.

Additonally, Spain's Muslims are primarily first generation immigrants. As a result, there has not been a lot of time to evaluate the effectiveness of Spanish efforts. If Marc Sageman's argument – that second and third generation Muslims constitute the new wave of Islamic terrorists – is correct, Spain has yet to deal with this threat.²²⁴ Instead, Spain is dealing with Islamic terrorists – such as those responsible for the attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004 – who are not likely to be affected by policies of multiculturalism.

Denmark, in contrast, has taken an assimilationist approach to Muslims in Danish society while incorporating anti-radicalization efforts to prevent Islamic terrorism.

However, there is a disparity between what Denmark's security services do and what its public officials are saying. In response to strong anti-immigrant and anti-globalization feelings within Danish society, the national government led by the Danish People's Party (DPP) has strengthened immigration requirements and reduced welfare benefits. Both policies have affected the Muslim community more than other segments of Danish society. These policies have caused many Muslims to feel that both the majority population and the government regard them as unwelcome in Denmark. At the same time, the security services are conducting community outreach programs to build trust with the local Muslim community. The differing government responses may lend credibility to radical Islamist anti-Western arguments.

Spain and Denmark have chosen fundamentally different methods and approaches to the integration of their Muslim minorities with a view to preventing their

²²⁴ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 47-52.

radicalization. While the efforts by both countries meet the EU's legal standards, the success of each set of efforts is debatable. Given the distinctively different approaches, it is difficult to determine whether any particular integration measure or systematic approach has been more effective than another. The lack of a common strategy on the integration of Muslims may be hindering the anti-radicalization efforts of member states throughout the EU. While a common strategy on integration might not solve all the problems of radicalization, it would provide a base line from which member states could begin. It might also avoid the sudden changes in governmental policies that are reactions to shifts in public opinion. It might create a unity of effort throughout the European Union. The precedent for a common anti-radicalization strategy has been established with current efforts to forge a common immigration policy for the EU. The 25 September 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum is a step towards a common policy in this area. Since immigration is intricately tied to integration, it seems logical to extend these current efforts to include common EU integration and anti-radicalization policies.

Alternatively, the European Union might wish to consider undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the anti-radicalization strategies being pursued by each EU member state. Such an analysis could throw light on common problems as well as country-specific idiosyncratic factors. It could also identify the most promising approaches.

B. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Spain and Denmark are test cases for the future of the European Union. Spain's policies would imply the pursuit of a multiethnic European Union that is seeking ways in which to incorporate all of its minorities into multicultural national societies which protect cultural and national identities. Denmark's policies would suggest the development of an EU whose member nations are focused on preserving their cultural heritage by assimilating different ethnic groups into a common identity.

At present, it appears that the member nations of the EU are moving toward the Spanish model, with its protection of national identities and emphasis on

multiculturalism. The relatively weak EU system, with its requirement for consensus, supports this. However, owing to recent setbacks in the economic performance of the EU and worries over increasing immigration, the EU may begin a shift toward the Denmark model. If the gradual movement toward a supranational state continues, the EU may eventually have to create a common European identity. But if its member states cannot agree on a strategy to integrate their Muslim minorities into the host societies, what hope does the EU have to forge disparate national identities into a European one?

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